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Abstract
The logic iGLC is the intuitionistic version of Lo¨b’s Logic plus the completeness principle A → A. In this
paper, we prove an arithmetical completeness theorems for iGLC for theories equipped with two provability
predicates  and △ that prove the schemes A → △A and △S → S for S ∈ Σ1. We provide two salient
instances of the theorem. In the first,  is fast provability and △ is ordinary provability and, in the second,
 is ordinary provability and △ is slow provability.
Using the second instance, we reprove a theorem previously obtained by M. Ardeshir and S. Mojtaba Mojtahedi
[AM17] determining the Σ1-provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic.
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2
1 Introduction
Around 1930, Kurt Go¨del proved his celebrated incompleteness theorems. While these results
can be seen as the culmination of one era of logical research, they also cleared the way for
several new fields within mathematical logic. An example of such a field is provability logic,
a topic that still occupies logicians today. Provability logic takes one of the main ingredients
of Go¨del’s theorems as its starting point. This ingredient is the formalization of the notion
‘formally provable in a certain arithmetical theory T ’ inside the language of arithmetic itself.
Once this step has been taken, one may wonder what a theory T is able to prove about its
own notion of provability. This object, i.e. what a theory T can prove about its own notion of
provability, is called the provability logic of T . Let us write, as we will below, ‘⊢T A’ for ‘A is
formally provable in T ’, and ‘TA’ for the arithmetical formula expressing that A is formally
provable in T . Then under some reasonable assumptions, the following turn out to hold:
(i) if ⊢T A, then ⊢T TA;
(ii) ⊢T T (A→ B)→ (TA→ TB);
(iii) ⊢T TA→ TTA.
These are known nowadays as the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions. Using another
key idea from Go¨del’s theorems, the Diagonalization Lemma, one can derive from these that
⊢T T (TA→ A)→ TA, a result known as Lo¨b’s Theorem. In 1976, Robert Solovay proved
that for the theory Peano Arithmetic, the schemes (i)-(iii) and Lo¨b’s Theorem completely
describe its provability logic [Sol76].
Provability logics are not monotone in their corresponding theories. That is, if T is a theory
extending another theory U , then it is not in general true that the provability logic of T
extends the provability logic of U . In light of this, it is all the more surprising that, in the
classical case, provability logics are immensely stable. Solovay’s proof can be modified to
show that any Σ1-sound theory interpreting Elementary Arithmetic has the same provability
logic as Elementary Arithmetic. These include theories as strong as Zermelo-Fraenkel Set
Theory (with or without the Axiom of Choice).
Elementary Arithmetic is a classical theory, which is why we made the caveat ‘in the classical
case’ above. In the intuitionistic case, the situation is completely different. Solovay’s proof
simply does not work for intuitionistic theories. This shows itself in the fact that the provabil-
ity logic of Heyting Arithmetic, the intuitionistic counterpart of Peano Arithmetic, contains
principles that the provability logic of Peano Arithmetic does not share. These principles
are somewhat exotic, and it is unknown what the provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic
exactly is. In fact, as far as we are aware, there is presently only one intuitionistic theory for
which a nontrivial provability logic is known, a result due to the first author (see [Vis82] and
Remark 4.2.3).
In Solovay’s proof, the semantics of (classical) modal logic plays a major role. The larger part
of the proof consists of embedding models for modal logic in a certain way into the theory
T . These models are equipped with an accessibility relation. Solovay uses the predicate T
to represent this relation inside the theory T . One may try to give a Solovay-style proof by
replacing the models for classical modal logic by models for intuitionistic modal logic. The
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difficulty about these models, however, is that they also possess an intuitionistic relation, in
addition to the accessibility relation. The main question then becomes how we can deal with
these two relations.
The main goal of this paper is to find interesting situations where we can give a Solovay-style
embedding of a model for intuitionistic modal logic. We zoom in on models of the provability
logic iGLC. This logic is iGL, the intuitionistic version of Lo¨b’s Logic, plus the Completeness
Principle A → A. This logic is, in a sense, the simplest interesting provability logic. Its
models are pleasantly simple and hence good candidates for embeddability.
The Kripke models for iGLC have two accessibility relations. To make the embedding work
we use two notions of provability each one corresponding to one of the accessibility relations.
As a result we obtain arithmetical completeness results for iGLC in various theories and for
various interpretations of .
Our Solovay-style embedding is presented in detail below. The embedding can be used to
obtain a variety of results in provability logic. Among these is the determination of the Σ1-
provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic, an object related to the ordinary provability logic of
Heyting Arithmetic. This is not a new result. It was already obtained in 2014 by M. Ardeshir
and S. Mojtaba Mojtahedi [AM17], but the present work arrives at it in a different way.
We stress, however, that our proof could not have been devised without the work from the
paper [AM17]. First of all, it is of course easier to determine a provability logic if one already
knows what it should be. Moreover, even though our proof is different, we do use some key
ingredients from the paper [AM17], most notably the TNNIL-algorithm.
Let us briefly outline the structure of the paper. First of all, in Section 2, we discuss all the
necessary prerequisite knowledge, and fix our notation. This section contains no essentially
new results, but we do prove some results from the paper [Vis82] under weaker assumptions.
For reasons of space, we will not spell out any specific Go¨del numberings or give an explicit
definition of the predicate T . Therefore, it will be useful to have some prior experience
with Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems and with provability logic (in the classical case) when
reading this paper. A reader that is already familiar with (some of) the concepts discussed
in Section 2 may want to read (a portion of) this chapter only superficially, and refer back
to it if necessary. In Section 3, we present our Solovay-style embedding, and formulate our
central completeness theorem. This theorem will be stated in an abstract way that does
not yet mention any specific theories or provability predicates. In Section 4, we will present
several applications of our completeness theorem, among which the determination of the
Σ1-provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic.
An earlier version of the current paper was submitted by the second author as a thesis for the
MA degree in philosophy at Utrecht University. This thesis was supervised by the first author.
We would like to thank Rosalie Iemhoff, Lev Beklemishev and Sven Bosman for commenting
on drafts of this thesis and the current paper. We are grateful to Mojtaba Mojtahedi for his
comments on the preprint version.
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2 Prerequisites
In this section, we develop some notation and theory that will be used in the later parts of
the paper. First, in Section 2.1, we fix some basic notions about arithmetical theories and
provability predicates. Then, in Section 2.2, we discuss the T -translation, which will lead
to theories that prove their own completeness. In Section 2.3, we turn our attention to two
nonstandard notions of provability, called fast and slow provability. Finally, in Section 2.4,
we develop some intuitionistic (propositional) modal logic.
2.1 Arithmetic and Provability
All the theories we shall consider will be theories for intuitionistic predicate logic with equality.
As our proof system, we pick natural deduction with equality. An axiom will be viewed as a
special case of an inference rule, namely as an inference rule whose premiss set is empty. For
equality, we have the axiom x = x, and an inference rule involving substitution. The language
in which our theories will be fomulated will be the language of arithmetic L = {0,S,+,×}.
Here 0 is a constant symbol, S is a unary function symbol and + and × are binary function
symbols. For each n ∈ N, we can define the L-term S . . . S0, where the S occurs exactly n
times. This term is called the numeral of n, and we denote it just by n. For terms s and t, we
define s ≤ t as ∃x(s+ x = t) and s < t as ∃x(s+ Sx = t). Here x should not occur in s or t,
of course. We notice that the language L has a straightforward interpretation in the natural
numbers, yielding the standard model N. We introduce two special classes of formulae.
Definition 2.1.1. (i) The set of ∆0-formulae is defined by recursion, as follows:
(a) all atomic L-formulae are ∆0-formulae;
(b) the set of ∆0-formulae is closed under conjunction, disjunction and implication;
(c) if A is a ∆0-formula, and t is an L-term not containing the variable x, then the
formulae ∃x(x < t ∧A) and ∀x(x < t→ A) are also ∆0-formulae.
We write A ∈ ∆0 if A is a ∆0-formula.
(ii) The set of Σ1-formulae consists of all L-formulae of the form ∃xA, where A ∈ ∆0. We
write S ∈ Σ1 if S is a Σ1-formula. ♦
To each L-expression α (which can be a term, a formula or a sequence of formulae), we assign
a Go¨del number pαq in some reasonable way. More precisely, we require that elementary
syntactic operations concerning L are elementary functions (to be defined below) in terms of
their Go¨del numbers.
Definition 2.1.2. A theory T will be a pair (Th(T ),AxT ), where AxT is a Σ1-formula in one
free variable, and Th(T ) is precisely the set of L-formulae derivable from the axiom set
{A | A an L-formula, N |= AxT (pAq)}. ♦
In other words, a theory is a set of L-formulae that is closed under derivability in intuition-
istic predicate logic with equality, together with a Σ1-formula that defines an axiom set for
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the theory in the standard model. Usually, we will define a theory by giving its axioms,
understanding that their is some natural Σ1-formulation in L for axiomhood. For a set of
L-formulae Γ and an L-formula A, we write Γ ⊢T A to indicate that A is provable using open
assumptions from Γ and the axioms of T . Notice that ⊢T A just means A ∈ Th(T ). Now we
define three theories that will be of great interest to us.
Definition 2.1.3. (i) The theory iIΣ1, called intuitionistic Σ1-induction, has the axioms
¬(Sx = 0) Sx = Sy → x = y
x+ 0 = 0 x+ Sy = S(x+ y)
x× 0 = 0 x× Sy = x× y + x
and, for each L-formula S ∈ Σ1, the induction axiom
S[0/x] ∧ ∀x(S → S[Sx/x])→ ∀xS.
(ii) The theory HA, called Heyting arithmetic, has all the axioms of iIΣ1, together with full
induction: for each L-formula A, we have the axiom
A[0/x] ∧ ∀x(A→ A[Sx/x])→ ∀xA.
(iii) The theory PA, called Peano arithmetic, has all the axioms of HA, together with the
Law of the Excluded Middle: A ∨ ¬A, where A is an L-formula. ♦
Even though the axiom set we presented for iIΣ1 is infinite, the theory iIΣ1 is actually
finitely axiomatizable. This is because the induction scheme for Σ1-formulae follows the
single induction axiom for the Σ1-truth predicate, which is itself a Σ1-formula. The finite
axiomatizability of iIΣ1 is verifiable in iIΣ1 itself. It is also well-known that iIΣ1, and hence
any theory extending it, is Σ1-complete. That is, every Σ1-sentence true in the standard
model can be proven inside iIΣ1.
Even though iIΣ1 is an intuitionistic theory, we do have the following result, which can be
shown using induction on complexity.
Proposition 2.1.4. If A ∈ ∆0 is a formula, then ⊢i IΣ1 A ∨ ¬A.
We also have the following result, that we shall not prove.
Proposition 2.1.5. Let F : Nk → N be a primitive recursive function. Then there exists a
Σ1-formula AF (~x, y) satisfying:
(i) ⊢i IΣ1 AF (~n, F (~n)) for all ~n ∈ N
k;
(ii) ⊢i IΣ1 ∃y∀z (AF (~x, z)↔ y = z).
Moreover, this formula can be chosen in such a way that the definition of F as a primitive
recursive function is verifiable in iIΣ1.
We have a primitive recursive function Subst: N2 → N that is defined as follows. If a is
the Go¨del number of some formula A(v) in one free variable v, then Subst(a, b) = pA(b)q;
otherwise, Subst(a, b) = 0. We can represent this function in iIΣ1 using Proposition 2.1.5.
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If A(v) is a formula with one free variable, we will write pA(x˜)q for Subst(pA(v)q, x), which
makes sense when working in a theory extending iIΣ1. We apply similar conventions for
multiple free variables. We will need the following famous result, that we will not prove.
Theorem 2.1.6 (Diagonalization Lemma). Suppose A(~x, y) is an L-formula. Then there
exists an L-formula B(~x) such that ⊢i IΣ1 B(~x)↔ A(~x, pB(~x)q).
Now suppose we have a theory T . Using the Σ1-formula AxT , we can construct a Σ1-formula
BewT (x) that expresses ‘x is the Go¨del number of some formula A such that ⊢T A’ in a natural
way. We can write Bew(x) as ∃yPrfT (y, x) for some ∆0-formula PrfT . We think of Prf(y, x)
as expressing the fact that y codes a T -proof of the formula that has x as its Go¨del number.
For a formula A = A(x1, . . . , xn), we write TA for BewT (pA(x˜1, . . . , x˜n)q). In particular,
TA has the same free variables as A. Now we can define certain relations between theories.
Definition 2.1.7. Let U and T be theories. We write:
(i) U ⊆ T if Th(U) ⊆ Th(T );
(ii) U = T if Th(U) = Th(T );
(iii) U ≤ T if ⊢i IΣ1 BewU (x)→ BewT (x);
(iv) U ≡ T if ⊢i IΣ1 BewU (x)↔ BewT (x). ♦
We emphasize that, then we write U = T , we do not mean an equality of the pairs (Th(U),AxU )
and (Th(T ),AxT ), but only an equality of the first coordinate. Since iIΣ1 is sound, we see
that U ≤ T implies that U ⊆ T . We also notice that, if U and T are theories such that
⊢i IΣ1 AxU (x) → AxT (x), then U ≤ T clearly holds. However, this requirement is not neces-
sary: it can also be the case that every U -proof can (verifiably in iIΣ1) be transformed into a
T -proof without the one axiom set being contained in the other. Before we can develop more
theory, we need to restrict our investigation to theories that, verifiably in iIΣ1, can perform
a minimal amount of arithmetic.
Convention 2.1.8. All the theories T we shall consider, will satisfy iIΣ1 ≤ T . ♦
Remark 2.1.9. As Definition 2.1.7 and Convention 2.1.8 make clear, iIΣ1 will serve as our
base theory. Most, but not all, of the following goes through for slightly weaker base theories,
such as (intuitionistic) Elementary Arithmetic extended with Σ1-collection. We have chosen
iIΣ1 because this yields the most simple and uniform exposition of the material below. ♦
Notice that this clearly holds for the three theories from Definition 2.1.3. With this require-
ment in place, we can state some basic properties of T , that we will not prove.
Proposition 2.1.10. Let T be a theory and let A, B and S be L-formulae. Then we have:
(i) ⊢T A if and only if N |= TA, if and only if ⊢i IΣ1 TA;
(ii) ⊢i IΣ1 T (A→ B)→ (TA→ TB);
(iii) ⊢i IΣ1 TA→ TTA;
(iv) (Formalized Σ1-completeness) if S ∈ Σ1, then ⊢i IΣ1 S → TS;
(v) (Lo¨b’s Principle) if U is a theory such that U ⊆ T and ⊢U TA→ A, then ⊢U A;
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(vi) (Lo¨b’s Theorem) ⊢i IΣ1 T (TA→ A)→ TA.
Moreover, (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vi) are verifiable in iIΣ1.
We remark that for (iii)-(vi), we need Convention 2.1.8. In the next section, we will need the
following facts.
Proposition 2.1.11. Let U and T be theories.
(i) If U ⊆ T , then ⊢U A implies ⊢U TA for all L-formulae A.
(ii) If U ≤ T , then ⊢i IΣ1 BewU (x)→ UBewT (x). In particular, ⊢i IΣ1 UA→ UTA for
all L-formulae A.
Proof. (i) If ⊢U A, then also ⊢T A, so ⊢i IΣ1 TA. Since iIΣ1 ⊆ U , we also get ⊢U TA.
(ii) Since U ≤ T , we have ⊢i IΣ1 BewU (x)→ BewT (x). Since iIΣ1 ⊆ U (by Convention 2.1.8),
it follows from (i) that ⊢i IΣ1 UBewU (x) → UBewT (x). We also have ⊢i IΣ1 BewU (x) →
UBewU (x) by formalized Σ1-completeness, and now the result follows.
For future use, we state the following definition.
Definition 2.1.12. Let T be a theory and let P (x) be a Σ1-formula in one free variable. For
an L-sentence A, we write A for P (pAq). We say that P is a provability predicate for T if
the following hold for all L-sentences A, B and S:
(i) if ⊢T A, then N |= A;
(ii) ⊢i IΣ1 (A→ B)→ (A→ B);
(iii) if S ∈ Σ1, then ⊢i IΣ1 S → S. ♦
Observe that the above definition has the following monotonicity property: if T ′ ⊆ T are
theories and P is a provability predicate for T , then P is also a provability predicate for T ′.
Using Proposition 2.1.10, we see that BewT is always a provability predicate for T . In fact,
any provability predicate for T has properties similar to those of BewT , as the following result,
whose proof is standard, shows.
Proposition 2.1.13. Let P be provability predicate for a theory T . For L-sentences A, write
A for P (pAq). Then for all L-sentences A, we have:
(i) ⊢i IΣ1 A→ A;
(ii) if U is a theory such that U ⊆ T and ⊢U A→ A, then ⊢U A;
(iii) ⊢i IΣ1 (A→ A)→ A.
2.2 The Completeness Principle
In this section, we introduce the T -translation, that will allow us to define theories that prove
their own completeness. All results in this section are from the paper On the Completeness
Principle [Vis82], but we have formulated some of them under weaker conditions.
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Definition 2.2.1. Let T be a theory. We define the T -translation (·)T from the set of
L-formulae to itself by recursion. For all L-terms s and t and L-formulae A and B, we set:
(i) (s = t)T is s = t and ⊥T is ⊥;
(ii) (A ◦B)T is AT ◦BT for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨};
(iii) (A→ B)T is (AT → BT ) ∧T (A
T → BT );
(iv) (∃xA)T is ∃xAT ;
(v) (∀xA)T is ∀xAT ∧T (∀xA
T ). ♦
Based on the T -translation, we can construct new theories out of existing ones.
Definition 2.2.2. Let U and T be theories. We define the theory UT as the theory whose
axioms are those of iIΣ1, together with the set {A | ⊢U A
T }. For a theory U , we write U∗ for
UU . ♦
We make some remarks on how AxUT can be defined. The function (·)
T : N→ N that satisfies
xT = pAT q if x is the Go¨del number of an L-formula A, and xT = 0 otherwise, is primitive
recursive. This means that we can represent this function in iIΣ1 using Proposition 2.1.5.
Now we define AxUT (x) as Axi IΣ1(x)∨ (Form(x)∧BewU (x
T )), where Form(x) ∈ Σ1 naturally
expresses the fact that x is the Go¨del number of an L-formula. We study the relation between
provability in UT and provability in U through the following lemmata. Our first lemma is
the raison d’eˆtre for the T -translation.
Lemma 2.2.3. For all L-formulae A, we have ⊢i IΣ1 A
T → TA
T . Moreover, this is verifiable
in iIΣ1.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of A.
At If A is atomic, then AT = A and the claim follows from Proposition 2.1.10(iv) since A
is a Σ1-formula.
∧ Suppose A = B ∧ C and the claim holds for B and C. Then AT is BT ∧ CT , and we
have
⊢i IΣ1 B
T ∧ CT → TB
T ∧TC
T → T (B
T ∧ CT ),
as desired.
∨ Suppose A is B ∨ C and the claim holds for B and C. Then AT is BT ∨ CT , and we
have ⊢i IΣ1 B
T → TB
T → T (B
T ∨ CT ) and ⊢i IΣ1 C
T → TC
T → T (B
T ∨ CT ),
which together yield ⊢i IΣ1 B
T ∨ CT → T (B
T ∨ CT ), as desired.
→ Suppose A is B → C and the claim holds for B and C. Then the formula AT is equal
to (BT → CT ) ∧T (B
T → CT ), and we have
⊢i IΣ1 (B
T → CT ) ∧T (B
T → CT )→ T (B
T → CT )
→ T (B
T → CT ) ∧TT (B
T → CT )
→ T ((B
T → CT ) ∧T (B
T → CT )),
as desired.
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∃ Suppose A is ∃xB and the claim holds for B. Then AT is ∃xBT . It is provable
in intuitionistic predicate logic that BT → ∃xBT , so we also have ⊢i IΣ1 TB
T →
T (∃xB
T ). We get ⊢i IΣ1 ∃xB
T → ∃xTB
T → T (∃xB
T ), as desired.
∀ Suppose A is ∀xB and the claim holds for B. Then AT is ∀xBT ∧T (∀xB
T ), and we
have
⊢i IΣ1 ∀xB
T ∧T (∀xB
T )→ T (∀xB
T )
→ T (∀xB
T ) ∧TT (∀xB
T )
→ T (∀xB
T ∧T (∀xB
T )),
as desired.
For the second statement, we should carry out this induction inside iIΣ1. One should notice
that now we need that clauses (ii)-(iv) from Proposition 2.1.10 are verifiable in iIΣ1.
Next we show that, up to equivalence, Σ1-formulae are invariant under the T -translation.
Lemma 2.2.4. If T is a theory and S is a Σ1-formula, then ⊢i IΣ1 S ↔ S
T . Moreover, this
is verifiable in iIΣ1.
Proof. If A is a ∆0-formula, then ⊢i IΣ1 A → TA, which means that ⊢i IΣ1 A ∧ TA ↔ A.
Using this observation, we can show that ⊢i IΣ1 A↔ A
T for all A ∈ ∆0 using a straightforward
induction on the complexity of A. Finally, if S ∈ Σ1, then write S as ∃xA with A ∈ ∆0.
Then ST is ∃xAT , and we see that ⊢i IΣ1 ∃xA↔ ∃xA
T , as desired.
For the second statement, we formalize the above in iIΣ1.
Finally, we collect some technical facts about the interaction between the T -translation and
substitution.
Lemma 2.2.5. Let A be a formula, let x be a variable, and let s be a term. Then:
(i) A and AT have the same free variables;
(ii) s is free for x in A if and only if s is free for x in AT ;
(iii) if s is free for x in A, then ⊢i IΣ1 (A
T )[s/x]↔ (A[s/x])T .
Moreover, these are all verifiable in iIΣ1.
Proof. All three statements can be proven by an easy induction on the complexity of A. For
the induction steps for implication and universal quantification in statement (iii), one should
observe that, verifiably in iIΣ1, we have ⊢i IΣ1 (TA)[s/x] ↔ T (A[s/x]) for all L-terms s
and L-formulae A.
Using these lemmata, we can prove the following crucial result.
Theorem 2.2.6. Let U and T be theories such that ⊢U B implies ⊢U TB for all L-formulae
B. For a set of L-formulae Γ, write ΓT = {BT | B ∈ Γ}. Then for all L-formulae A, we
have Γ ⊢UT A if and only if Γ
T ⊢U A
T .
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Remark 2.2.7. (i) By Proposition 2.1.11(i), the conditions on U and T apply in particular
when U ⊆ T . We formulate this theorem (and Corollary 2.2.10 below) in such a strong
way in order to obtain Proposition 2.3.8 below.
(ii) We warn the reader that, under these conditions on U and T , we cannot necessarily
verify the result ‘Γ ⊢UT A if and only if Γ
T ⊢U A
T ’ inside iIΣ1; see Corollary 2.2.10
below. ♦
Proof of Theorem 2.2.6. Suppose that ΓT ⊢U A
T . Then there exist n ≥ 0 and C1, · · · , Cn ∈ Γ
such that ⊢U C
T
0 ∧ . . . ∧ C
T
n → A
T . Then we also have ⊢U (C0 ∧ . . . ∧ Cn)
T → AT , and by
our assumption, we also get ⊢U T ((C0 ∧ . . . ∧ Cn)
T → AT ). So ⊢U (C0 ∧ . . . ∧ Cn → A)
T ,
and therefore we get ⊢UT C0 ∧ . . . ∧ Cn → A. Finally, this clearly yields that Γ ⊢UT A.
For the converse direction, we proceed by induction on the proof tree for Γ ⊢UT A. Before
we start, we notice the following: if ⊢U B → C for certain L-formulae B and C, then by our
assumption, ⊢U T (B → C). We also have ⊢U T (B → C) → (TB → TC), so we get
⊢U TB → TC. We also note: if ⊢i IΣ1 B, then ⊢U B, whence ⊢U TB.
First, suppose that A is an axiom of UT . That is, we suppose that A is an axiom of iIΣ1 or
that ⊢U A
T . In the latter case, we are done. So suppose that A is an axiom of iIΣ1. We
need to show that ⊢U A
T . If A is the axiom x = x or a basic axiom of iIΣ1, then A ∈ ∆0,
so by Lemma 2.2.4, we have ⊢i IΣ1 A ↔ A
T . Since ⊢i IΣ1 A, we also get ⊢i IΣ1 A
T , and in
particular, ⊢U A
T . It remains to prove the claim for the case where A is an induction axiom,
say S[0/x] ∧ ∀x(S → S[Sx/x])→ ∀xS with S ∈ Σ1. First of all, we notice that
⊢i IΣ1 (∀x(S → S[Sx/x]))
T ↔ ∀x(S → S[Sx/x])T ∧T (∀x(S → S[Sx/x])
T )
→ ∀x(ST → (S[Sx/x])T ) ∧T (∀x(S
T → (S[Sx/x])T ))
↔ ∀x(ST → (ST )[Sx/x]) ∧T (∀x(S
T → (ST )[Sx/x])). (2.1)
Furthermore, we know that ⊢i IΣ1 (S[0/x])
T ↔ (ST )[0/x] and that (∀xS)T is the formula
∀xST ∧T (∀xS
T ). Define the formulae
C :↔ (ST )[0/x] ∧ ∀x(ST → (ST )[Sx/x]) ∧T (∀x(S
T → (ST )[Sx/x]))→ ∀xST ∧T (∀xS
T ),
D :↔ (S[0/x])T ∧ (∀x(S → S[Sx/x]))T → (∀xS)T .
Then it follows from (2.1) that ⊢i IΣ1 C → D. Now we also get ⊢U C → D and hence
⊢U TC → TD. Since A
T is the formula D ∧TD, we see that ⊢U C ∧TC → A
T . So it
suffices to show that ⊢U C.
Since S ∈ Σ1, we have ⊢i IΣ1 S ↔ S
T . This means that the induction axiom for ST is provable
in iIΣ1, hence in U :
⊢U (S
T )[0/x] ∧ ∀x(ST → (ST )[Sx/x])→ ∀xST . (2.2)
Now it follows that
⊢U T ((S
T )[0/x]) ∧T (∀x(S
T → (ST )[Sx/x]))→ T (∀xS
T ). (2.3)
Finally, since ⊢i IΣ1 (S
T )[0/x]↔ (S[0/x])T , we can use Lemma 2.2.3 to see that
⊢i IΣ1 (S
T )[0/x]→ (S[0/x])T → T ((S[0/x])
T )→ T ((S
T )[0/x]). (2.4)
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From (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4), we may deduce that C is indeed provable in U , as desired.
Now we treat the rules of inference. Since the T -translation commutes with conjunction,
disjunction and existential quantification, the induction steps for rules of inference for these
operators are trivial. It remains to check the rules for implication and universal quantification,
and the substitution rule.
→E Suppose that ΓT ⊢U (B → C)
T and ΓT ⊢U B
T . We need to show that ΓT ⊢U C
T . But
this is obvious since ⊢i IΣ1 (B → C)
T → (BT → CT ).
→I Suppose that ΓT , BT ⊢U C
T . We need to show that ΓT ⊢U (B → C)
T . We certainly
have ΓT ⊢U B
T → CT . But then we also have TΓ
T ⊢U T (B
T → CT ), where
TΓ
T = {TD
T | D ∈ Γ}. Since ⊢i IΣ1 D
T → TD
T for all D ∈ Γ, we get ΓT ⊢U
T (B
T → CT ). Combining our results, we find
ΓT ⊢U (B
T → CT ) ∧T (B
T → CT ),
as desired.
∀E Suppose that ΓT ⊢U (∀xB)
T . We need to show that ΓT ⊢U (B[s/x])
T . Since ⊢i IΣ1
(∀xB)T → ∀xBT , we see that ΓT ⊢U (B
T )[s/x]. Since we also know that ⊢i IΣ1
(BT )[s/x]↔ (B[s/x])T , we get ΓT ⊢U (B[s/x])
T , as desired.
∀I Suppose that ΓT ⊢U B
T , where the variable x does not occur anywhere in Γ. We need
to show that ΓT ⊢U (∀xB)
T . First of all, we certainly have ΓT ⊢U ∀xB
T , since x does
not occur free anywhere in ΓT . By applying the same reasoning as in the →I-case, we
find ΓT ⊢U T (∀xB
T ). We conclude that ΓT ⊢U ∀xB
T ∧T (∀xB
T ), as desired.
Subst Suppose that ΓT ⊢U (B[s/x])
T and ΓT ⊢U (s = t)
T . We need to show that ΓT ⊢U
(B[t/x])T . We have ΓT ⊢U s = t and by Lemma 2.2.5(iii), we get Γ
T ⊢U (B
T )[s/x].
This yields ΓT ⊢U (B
T )[t/x], and thus ΓT ⊢U (B[t/x])
T , as desired.
This completes the induction.
From (the proof of) this theorem, we can deduce a number of results. Our first result says
that under the assumption of Theorem 2.2.6, our construction does not build inconsistent
theories out of consistent ones.
Corollary 2.2.8. If U and T are theories such that ⊢U A implies ⊢U TA for all L-formulae
A, then the theories U and UT prove the same Σ1-formulae. In particular, U
T is consistent
if and only if U is consistent.
Proof. The first statement follows immediately from Lemma 2.2.4 and Theorem 2.2.6. The
second statement now follows since ⊥ ∈ Σ1.
Our next corollary tells us that the T -translation respects equivalence over iIΣ1.
Corollary 2.2.9. Let T be a theory and let A and B be L-formulae. If A ⊢i IΣ1 B, then
AT ⊢i IΣ1 B
T .
Proof. If A ⊢i IΣ1 B, then also A ⊢i IΣ1T B. By applying Theorem 2.2.6 with U ≡ iIΣ1, we
find that AT ⊢i IΣ1 B
T .
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The following result is the formalized counterpart of Theorem 2.2.6.
Corollary 2.2.10. Let U , V and T be theories such that ⊢V BewU(x)→ UBewT (x). Then
⊢V UTA↔ UA
T for all L-formulae A.
Remark 2.2.11. By Proposition 2.1.11(ii), the requirement on U , V and T is satisfied when
U ≤ T . ♦
Proof of Corollary 2.2.10. The ‘←’-direction is immediate as it follows from the definition of
UT , and it does not need the requirement on U , V and T . Concretely, we have
⊢i IΣ1 Form(x) ∧ BewU (x
T )→ AxUT (x)→ BewUT (x).
From this, the desired result follows.
For the ‘→’-direction, we formalize the proof of the left-to-right direction of Theorem 2.2.6
inside V . We need that the statements of Proposition 2.1.10, Lemma 2.2.3 and Lemma 2.2.5
are verifiable in iIΣ1, hence in V . If we restrict the result to the case where Γ is empty, we
get ⊢V BewUT (x)→ BewU (x
T ), from which the desired result will follow.
Finally, we discuss the relationship between HA and the T -translation.
Corollary 2.2.12. Let U , V and T be theories.
(i) If HA ⊆ U , and ⊢U A implies ⊢U TA for all L-formulae A, then HA ⊆ U
T .
(ii) If HA ≤ U and ⊢V BewU (x) → UBewT (x), then we have ⊢V HAA → UTA for all
L-formulae A.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 2.2.6, we have shown the following: if A is the induction
axiom for a certain formula B and U proves the induction axiom for BT , then ⊢U A
T . If
HA ⊆ U , then U proves all induction axioms, so U also proves AT for all induction axioms
A. We can conclude that HA ⊆ UT .
Statement (ii) follows by formalizing this argument in V .
Next, we isolate a special class of L-formulae that behaves well with respect to the T -
translation.
Definition 2.2.13. The set A is the smallest set of L-formulae such that
(i) A contains all atomic L-formulae;
(ii) A is closed under conjunction, disjunction, and both existential and universal quantifi-
cation;
(iii) if S ∈ Σ1 and A ∈ A, then S → A ∈ A. ♦
Lemma 2.2.14. Let T be a theory and let A ∈ A. Then ⊢i IΣ1 A
T → A.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of A. Only clause (iii) in the definition
of A is nontrivial. Suppose that A is S → B, where S ∈ Σ1, and that we already know the
result for B. Then ⊢i IΣ1 S ↔ S
T and ⊢i IΣ1 B
T → B, so
⊢i IΣ1 (S → B)
T → (ST → BT )→ (S → B),
as desired.
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At the beginning of this section, we promised to construct theories that prove their own
completeness. We now make this precise.
Definition 2.2.15. Let P (x) be a provability predicate for a theory T . Again, if A is an
L-sentence, we write A for P (pAq).
(i) The completeness principle CPP is the axiom scheme A → A, where A is an L-
sentence.
(ii) The strong Lo¨b principle SLPP is the axiom scheme (A → A) → A, where A is an
L-sentence.
We will also write CP instead of CPP . This is actually a slight abuse of notation, because is
merely an abbreviation and CP really depends on P (x). We write CPT for CPT = CPBewT .
Similar conventions holds for SLP. ♦
It turns out that the two schemes introduced above are two guises of the same principle.
Lemma 2.2.16. Let P (x) be a provability predicate for a theory T . Then the CPP and SLPP
are interderivable over iIΣ1.
Proof. Define  as above, and let A be an L-sentence. First, we show that ⊢i IΣ1+CP SLP.
By Proposition 2.1.13(iii), we have
⊢i IΣ1+CP (A→ A)→ (A→ A)→ A,
from which ⊢i IΣ1+CP (A→ A)→ A follows.
Now we show that ⊢i IΣ1+SLP CP. Clearly, we have ⊢i IΣ1 (A ∧A)→ A, so
⊢i IΣ1+SLP A→ ((A ∧A)→ A ∧A)
→ A ∧A
→ A,
as desired.
Finally, here is the result we promised.
Lemma 2.2.17. For all theories U and T , we have ⊢UT CPT ∗. In particular, ⊢U∗ CPU∗.
Proof. Let A be an L-sentence. Since TA
T ∈ Σ1, we have that ⊢i IΣ1 TA
T → (TA
T )T .
So we get ⊢i IΣ1 A
T → TA
T → (TA
T )T , and also ⊢i IΣ1 T (A
T → (TA
T )T ). So we
find ⊢i IΣ1 (A → TA
T )T . This means that ⊢U (A → TA
T )T as well, so we find that
⊢UT A→ TA
T → T ∗A, as desired. The second statement follows by taking U ≡ T .
Remark 2.2.18. We remark that the proof of 2.2.17 also goes through if we replace the first
line with ‘Let A be an L-formula.’ We will not need this greater generality. ♦
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2.3 Fast and Slow Provability
In this section, we introduce two nonstandard notions of provability. The first of these is
fast provability, which can be seen as iterated provability. The second is slow provability, a
notion of provability that puts a certain size restriction on the axioms that may be used in a
proof. For developing the theory of fast provability, the following technique, that is also used
in [Hen16], will prove useful.
Lemma 2.3.1 (Reflexive induction). Let U ⊆ T be theories. Suppose A(x) is an L-formula
in one free variable such that ⊢U A[0/x] and ⊢U TA→ A[Sx/x]. Then ⊢U A.
Proof. It is provable in intuitionistic predicate logic that ∀xA→ A. So from our assumptions,
it follows that ⊢U T∀xA → TA → A[Sx/x]. Since we also know that ⊢U A[0/x], we get
⊢U T∀xA→ ∀xA. Using Lo¨b’s Principle, we can conclude that ⊢U ∀xA, so ⊢U A.
Definition 2.3.2. Let T be a theory.
(i) We define IBewT (u, x) as a formula satisfying
⊢i IΣ1 IBewT (u, x)↔ ((u = 0 ∧ BewT (x)) ∨ ∃v (u = Sv ∧T IBewT (v, x)))
as provided by the Diagonalization Lemma.
(ii) For an L-formula A = A(x1, . . . , xn), we write 
u+1
T A for IBewT (u, pA(x˜1, . . . , x˜n)q)
(iii) We write BewfT (x) for ∃u IBewT (u, x). Furthermore, for an L-formula A, we write 
f
TA
for ∃uu+1T A. ♦
Remark 2.3.3. As we shall see shortly, BewfT is a provability predicate for T . This notion of
provability is called fast provability and was introduced by Parikh in [Par71]. In this paper,
fast provability is introduced in a different way, namely by closing the set of theorems of T
under Parikh’s rule ‘from ⊢ TA, infer ⊢ A’, where A is an L-sentence. This yields, verifiably
in HA, the same notion of provability we defined here. If T is Σ1-sound, then Parikh’s rule
does not lead to any new theorems, so the notions of ordinary provability and fast provability
coincide. However, the use of Parikh’s rule can lead to much shorter proofs, which explains
the name ‘fast provability’. Later in this section, we will show that, if T is consistent, it is
never verifiable in iIΣ1 that fast provability coincides with ordinary provability. ♦
We notice that IBewT is equivalent, over iIΣ1, to a Σ1-formula. Informally, IBewT (u, x) can
be thought of as the formula BewT (· · · (BewT (x)) · · · ), where the BewT occurs u + 1 times,
so we can see IBewT as representing ‘iterated provability’. Notice that we write ‘u + 1’ in
the superscript of T , to indicate that the T ‘occurs’ u + 1 times. We prove a number of
technical facts about u+1T and 
f
T .
Lemma 2.3.4. Let T be a theory and let A and B be L-formulae. Then we have:
(i) ⊢i IΣ1 T
u+1
T A↔ 
Su+1
T A↔ 
u+1
T TA;
(ii) ⊢i IΣ1 u ≤ v → (
u+1
T A→ 
v+1
T A);
(iii) ⊢i IΣ1 
u+1
T (A→ B)→ (
u+1
T A→ 
u+1
T B),
(iv) ⊢i IΣ1 TA→ 
f
TA;
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(v) BewfT is a provability predicate for T ;
(vi) if T is Σ1-sound, then N |= 
f
TA if and only if N |= TA, if and only if ⊢T A;
(vii) ⊢i IΣ1 
f
TTA↔ 
f
TA.
(viii) if T is consistent, then 0i IΣ1 
f
T⊥ → T⊥.
Proof. (i) From the definition of IBewT , it follows that ⊢i IΣ1 T IBewT (u, x)↔ IBewT (Su, x),
so the first equivalence is immediate. For the second equivalence, we proceed by reflexive
induction. First of all, we have ⊢i IΣ1 
S0+1
T A ↔ T
0+1
T A ↔ TTA ↔ 
0+1
T TA. Fur-
thermore,
⊢i IΣ1 T (
Su+1
T A↔ 
u+1
T TA)→
[SSu+1T A↔ T
Su+1
T A
↔ T
u+1
T TA
↔ Su+1T TA],
which completes the proof.
(ii) Since u+1T A is a Σ1-formula, we have ⊢i IΣ1 
u+1
T A → T
u+1
T A → 
Su+1
T A. Now the
claim follows by induction on v inside iIΣ1.
(iii) We proceed by reflexive induction. First of all, we have
⊢i IΣ1 
0+1
T (A→ B)↔ T (A→ B)→ (TA→ TB)↔ (
0+1
T A→ 
0+1
T B).
Furthermore,
⊢i IΣ1 T (
u+1
T (A→ B)→ (
u+1
T A→ 
u+1
T B))→
[Su+1T (A→ B)↔ T
u+1
T (A→ B)
→ T (
u+1
T A→ 
u+1
T B)
→ (T
u+1
T A→ T
u+1
T B)
↔ (Su+1T A→ 
Su+1
T B)],
which completes the proof.
(iv) This is immediate as ⊢i IΣ1 TA↔ 
0+1
T A.
(v) This follows easily from (ii), (iii) and (iv).
(vi) The second equivalence was already asserted in Proposition 2.1.10(i). So we prove the
first equivalence. The right-to-left direction follows from (iv). For the converse, suppose that
N |= n+1A for a certain n ∈ N. If n = 0, then we are done. So suppose that n = m + 1
for a certain m ≥ 0. Then N |= T
m+1
T A, so ⊢T 
m+1
T A. Since T is Σ1-sound, we see that
N |= m+1T A. By repeating this argument, we find N |= TA, as desired.
(vii) This follows from ⊢i IΣ1 
u+1
T TA→ 
Su+1
T A and ⊢i IΣ1 
u+1
T A→ 
Su+1
T → 
u+1
T TA.
(viii) Suppose that ⊢i IΣ1 
f
T⊥ → T⊥. Then by (iv) and (vii), we have
⊢i IΣ1 TT⊥ → 
f
TT⊥ → 
f
T⊥ → T⊥,
so by Lo¨b’s Principle, we get ⊢i IΣ1 T⊥. Since iIΣ1 is Σ1-sound, we conclude that ⊢T ⊥.
Remark 2.3.5. It seems that in item (ii) above, we really need the presence of induction
over Σ1-formulae. The formula 
u+1
T A→ 
Su+1
T even provable in an intuitionistic version of
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Elementary Arithmetic. This means that passing from a witness of u+1T A to a witness of
Su+1T A is quite manageable, since this process is bounded by an elementary function. When
producing a witness of v+1T A from a witness of 
u+1
T A, however, we need to iterate this
process v− u times, which means that the bound becomes a lot larger: possibly too large for
weaker theories to handle. ♦
Now we prove the analogue of Corollary 2.2.10 for fast provability.
Lemma 2.3.6. Suppose U ≤ T are theories and let A be an L-formula. Then we have
⊢i IΣ1 
u+1
UT
A↔ u+1U A
T . In particular, ⊢i IΣ1 
f
UT
A↔ fUA
T
Proof. We proceed by reflexive induction. First of all, by Corollary 2.2.10, we have
⊢i IΣ1 
0+1
UT
A↔ UTA↔ UA
T ↔ 0+1U A
T .
Furthermore, by Lemma 2.2.4, Corollary 2.2.10 and Lemma 2.3.4(vii), we have
⊢i IΣ1 U (
u+1
UT
A↔ u+1U A
T )→
[Su+1
UT
A↔ UT
u+1
UT
A
↔ U(
u+1
UT
A)T
↔ U
u+1
UT
A
↔ U
u+1
U A
T
↔ Su+1U A
T ].
This completes the proof.
Now we turn to slow provability. We will not give as many details as we did for fast provability,
but instead we will refer to the paper [HP16]. There are two reasons for this. First of
all, developing the theory of slow provability is rather involved, so reasons of space do not
permit us to provide all the details. The second reason involves our intended usage of fast
and slow provability. In Section 4, we will obtain results about the provability logic of fast
provability. In order to understand and appreciate these results, it is important to know what
fast provability is, exactly. Slow provability, on the other hand, will only be used as a tool to
obtain results that themselves do not mention slow provability. In order to understand these
results, it is not necessary to know all the details about slow provability.
In the paper [HP16], the authors define a certain ‘fast-growing’ total recursive function
F : N → N. There exists a Σ1-formula ϕF (x, y) representing F in HA. This means that
the definition of F as a recursive function is verifiable in HA, and we have
⊢HA ∀y (ϕF (n, y)↔ y = F (n)) for all n ∈ N.
The Σ1-formula F (x)↓, which we read as ‘F (x) is defined’, is shorthand for ∃yϕF (x, y). We
clearly have that ⊢HA F (n)↓ for all n ∈ N. However, the fast-growing function F is constructed
is such a way that F is not provably total. That is, we do not have ⊢HA F (x)↓. Now we are
ready to define slow provability.
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Definition 2.3.7. The theory slow Heyting Arithmetic, denoted sHA, is given by the axiom
formula
AxsHA(x) :↔ Axi IΣ1(x) ∨ (AxHA(x) ∧ F (x)↓). ♦
Intuitively, we demand that the axioms we use must not be ‘too large’: they must not
be so large that they are beyond the domain of F . Since F is in fact total, we see that
N |= AxsHA(x) ↔ AxHA(x), which means that HA = sHA. We also clearly have that
⊢i IΣ1 AxsHA(x) → AxHA(x), so sHA ≤ HA. However, as we shall show shortly, we do not
have HA ≤ sHA. So from the viewpoint of HA, the requirement that the axioms must not be
too large is a genuine one.
Even though the base theory used in the paper [HP16] is the classical theory PA, many results
carry over to the present case. The most important of these is:
Proposition 2.3.8. We have ⊢HA BewHA(x) → HABewsHA(x), and in particular, we have
⊢HA HAsHAA↔ HAA
sHA for all L-formulae A.
Proof. The first statement is proven as in [HP16], Corollary 15, taking Sn to be the theory
axiomatized by the axioms of HA having Go¨del number at most n. The second statement
follows from Corollary 2.2.10 with U ≡ V ≡ HA and T ≡ sHA.
The converse of this result, which is valid for the classical case, does not carry over to the
current setting, because the authors of [HP16] use a model theoretic argument to derive this
result. However, we will only need a very weak version of this converse, which we can ‘steal’
from the classical case.
Proposition 2.3.9. (i) For all Σ1-sentences S, we have ⊢HA HAsHAS → HAS.
(ii) We have 0HA HA⊥ → sHA⊥. In particular, HA  sHA.
Proof. (i) We define the analogue of slow provability for PA, e.g. by setting
AxsPA(x) :↔ Axi IΣ1(x) ∨ (AxPA(x) ∧ ∃y ≥ x(F (y)↓)).
Since ⊢i IΣ1 AxHA(x) → AxPA(x), it is clear that HA ≤ PA and sHA ≤ sPA. We know from
[HP16], Theorem 4, that ⊢PA PAsPAS → PAS. So we get
⊢PA HAsHAS → PAsPAS → PAS → HAS,
where the final step holds since PA is, verifiably in HA, Σ1-conservative over HA. We notice
that HAsHAS → HAS is equivalent, over HA, to a Π2-sentence, that is, a sentence of
the form ∀xR(x), where R ∈ Σ1. Since PA is Π2-conservative over HA, we also find that
⊢HA HAsHAS → HAS, as desired.
(ii) Suppose that ⊢HA HA⊥ → sHA⊥. Since ⊥ ∈ Σ1, we have
⊢HA HAHA⊥ → HAsHA⊥ → HA⊥,
so by Lo¨b’s Theorem, we get ⊢HA HA⊥. But then HA is inconsistent, contradiction. For the
second statement, we observe that HA ≤ sHA would imply that HA⊥ → sHA⊥ is provable
in iIΣ1, hence also in HA.
Remark 2.3.10. There is an alternative approach to slow provability suggested by Fedor
Pakhomov in conversation to Albert Visser. In this approach we can prove the analogue of
Proposition 2.3.9(i) without the detour over PA and without the restriction to Σ1-sentences.
See [Vis18]. ♦
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2.4 Intuitionistic Modal Logic
In this section, we briefly review intuitionistic modal logic, abbreviated IML, and we define
the system of IML that will be relevant to us. The language L of IML has a countable set of
propositional constants, the absurdity sign ⊥, the usual binary connectives ∧, ∨ and →, and
the unary sentential operator . We shall also use L to denote the set of all L-sentences.
As our proof system, we pick a Hilbert-style system that has two inference rules:
A A→ B
→E
B
and A Nec
A
.
Definition 2.4.1. (i) The set iK ⊆ L is the smallest set that contains:
(a) all (L-substitution instances of) tautologies of intuitionistic propositional logic;
(b) all L-sentences of the form (A→ B)→ (A→ B), where A,B ∈ L,
and is closed under →E and Nec.
(ii) A theory for IML will be a set T that satisfies iK ⊆ T ⊆ L and is closed under →E
and Nec. If A ∈ L and Γ ⊆ L, we write Γ ⊢T A if there exists a finite subset Γ0 ⊆ Γ
such that
∧
Γ0 → A is in T .
(iii) The theory iGL is the smallest theory for IML that contains iK and all sentences of the
form (A→ A)→ A, where A ∈ L.
(iv) The theory iGLC is the smallest theory for IML that contains iGL and all sentences of
the form A→ A, where A ∈ L. ♦
We now proceed to define the semantics of intuitionistic modal logic.
Definition 2.4.2. (i) Consider a triple 〈W,,⊏〉, where W is a nonempty set and  and
⊏ are binary relations on W . We say that this triple satisfies the model property if
 ◦ ⊏ is a subrelation of ⊏. That is, for all w, v, u ∈ W we should have: if w  v ⊏ u,
then w ⊏ u.
(ii) A frame for IML is a triple 〈W,,⊏〉, where W is a nonempty set and  and ⊏ are
binary relations on W , such that: 〈W,〉 is a poset and 〈W,,⊏〉 satisfies the model
property.
(iii) A model for IML is a quadruple 〈W,,⊏, V 〉, where 〈W,,⊏〉 is a frame for IML and
V is a relation (called the valuation) between W and the proposition letters from L
satisfying:
w  v and wV p implies vV p,
for all w, v ∈W and proposition letters p.
(iv) Let M = 〈W,,⊏, V 〉 be a model for IML, let w ∈ W and let A ∈ L. We define the
forcing relation M,w  A by recursion on A, as follows. For all B,C ∈ L, we set:
(a) M,w  p iff wV p for all proposition letters p;
(b) M,w  B ∧ C iff M,w  B and M,w  C;
(c) M,w  B ∨ C iff M,w  B or M,w  C;
(d) M,w  B → C iff for all v ∈W such that w  v andM,v  B, we have M,v  C;
(e) M,w  B iff for all v ∈W such that w ⊏ v, we have M,v  B.
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If M is understood, we just write w  A instead of M,w  A. We write M  A
if M,w  A for all w ∈ W , in which case we say that A is valid on M . Given a
frame 〈W,,⊏〉 for IML, we say that A ∈ L is valid on this frame iff for all models
M = 〈W,,⊏, V 〉 for IML, we have that A is valid on M . ♦
Usually, one writes ‘R’ for the modal relation we call ‘⊏’ here. Our notation has certain
advantages that will become apparent in the next section. We impose the model property on
our frames because we want the following result:
Proposition 2.4.3 (Preservation of Knowledge). Let M = 〈W,,⊏, V 〉 be a model for IML.
If we have w, v ∈W and A ∈ L such that w  A and w  v, then v  A.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of A. The base case and the induction
steps for conjunction, disjunction and implication are trivial. So suppose that A is B and
that we have w, v ∈ W such that w  v and w  B. Consider any u ∈W such that v ⊏ u.
Then w  v ⊏ u, so since 〈W,,⊏〉 has the model property, we get w ⊏ u. Since w  B, it
follows that u  B. Since u was arbitrary, we can conclude that v  B, as desired.
For our purposes, the relevant frame properties are the following.
Definition 2.4.4. Let 〈W,,⊏〉 be a frame for IML.
(i) We say that this frame is irreflexive if ⊏ is irreflexive, that is, if ¬(w ⊏ w) for all w ∈W .
(ii) We say that this frame is transitive if ⊏ is transitive, that is, if ⊏ ◦ ⊏ is a subrelation
of ⊏.
(iii) We say that this frame is semi-transitive if ⊏ ◦ ⊏ is a subrelation of ⊏ ◦ .
(iv) We say that this frame is realistic if ⊏ is a subrelation of .
(v) We say that this frame is conversely well-founded if ⊏ is conversely well-founded, that
is, if every nonempty subset of W has a maximal element w.r.t. ⊏.
We say that a model for IML has one of the properties mentioned above if the underlying
frame has it. ♦
The terminology from (iii) is not standard and was suggested by R. Iemhoff. The idea behind
it is as follows. We can view ⊏ as an accessibility relation that is relative to the various
worlds, while  represents the ‘real’ accessibility between worlds. If, in a realistic frame, a
world w thinks that some world v is accessible, then v is also really accessible from w. We
observe that, due to the model property, a realistic frame is automatically transitive. Indeed,
suppose that 〈W,,⊏〉 is a realistic frame for IML and suppose we have w, v, u ∈ W such
that w ⊏ v ⊏ u. Then we also have w  v ⊏ u, so w ⊏ u follows, as desired.
Now we relate our frame properties to the axioms of iGLC.
Proposition 2.4.5. Let F = 〈W,,⊏〉 be a frame for intuitionistic modal logic.
(i) The sentence (p → p) → p is valid on F if and only if F is semi-transitive and
conversely well-founded.
(ii) The sentence p→ p is valid on F if and only if F is realistic.
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In particular, all theorems of iGLC are valid on all realistic and conversely well-founded frames.
Proof. (i) This result is known from the literature. We refer the reader to the paper [Iem01],
Lemma 8.
(ii) First, suppose that F is realistic. Let V be a valuation on F , and suppose we have w ∈W
such that w  p. If v ∈ W is such that w ⊏ v, then also w  v, so by preservation of
knowledge, we get v  p. We conclude that w  p, and thus that p→ p is valid on F .
Conversely, suppose that F is not realistic. Then there exist w, v ∈ K such that w ⊏ v, but
also w 6 v. We define a valuation V on F such that
xV p if and only if w  x.
Then wV p, but since w ⊏ v and ¬(vV p), we also have w 1 p. We conclude that w 1 p→ p
and thus that p→ p is not valid on F .
The final statement is easily proven by an induction on iGLC-proofs.
In order to get a completeness theorem, we need the following terminology.
Definition 2.4.6. Let T be a theory for intuitionistic modal logic.
(i) A set X ⊆ L is called adequate if it is closed under taking subsentences.
(ii) Suppose X ⊆ L is adequate. A set S ⊆ X is called X-saturated if the following hold:
(a) S is consistent, that is, S 0T ⊥;
(b) if A ∈ X and S ⊢T A, then A ∈ S;
(c) if A ∨B ∈ S, then A ∈ S or B ∈ S. ♦
Notice that the converse of item (b) also holds: if A ∈ S, then clearly A ∈ X and S ⊢T A.
We will need the following result.
Lemma 2.4.7 (Extension Lemma). Let T be a theory for intuitionistic modal logic and let
X ⊆ L be an adequate set. Suppose we have R ⊆ X and A ∈ L such that R 0T A. Then
there exists an X-saturated set S ⊇ R such that S 0T A.
Proof. We fix an enumeration B0, B1, B2, . . . of the formulae inX such that every element ofX
occurs infinitely many times in the enumeration. We define the sequence S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ . . .
by recursion. First of all, we set S0 = R. Now suppose that Sn has been defined. If Sn 0T Bn,
then Sn+1 is just Sn. If Sn ⊢T Bn, then
Sn+1 =

Sn ∪ {Bn} if Bn is not a disjunction;
Sn ∪ {Bn, C} if Bn is C ∨D, and Sn ∪ {C} 0T A;
Sn ∪ {Bn,D} if Bn is C ∨D, and Sn ∪ {C} ⊢T A;
We define S as
⋃
n∈N Sn. Clearly, we have Sn ⊆ X for all n ∈ N, so S ⊆ X.
Now we use induction on n to prove that Sn 0T A for all n ∈ N. For n = 0, this holds by
assumption. Now suppose that Sn 0T A for a certain n ∈ N; we need to show that Sn+1 0T A.
If Sn 0T Bn, then this holds trivially. So suppose that Sn ⊢T Bn. Then we must have that
Sn ∪ {Bn} 0T A, so if Bn is not a disjunction, then we are also done. So suppose that Bn
is C ∨D. If Sn ∪ {C} 0T A, then we also have Sn+1 = Sn ∪ {Bn, C} 0T A, so we are done.
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Finally, suppose that Sn ∪ {C} ⊢T A. Then we cannot have Sn ∪ {D} ⊢T A. Indeed, if we
have both Sn ∪ {C} ⊢T A and Sn ∪ {D} ⊢T A, then also Sn ∪ {C ∨D} ⊢T A, which is not
the case. So Sn ∪ {D} 0T A, and it follows that Sn+1 = Sn ∪ {Bn,D} 0T A, as desired. This
completes the induction.
It follows that S 0T A, and in particular, S is consistent. We check that S is X-saturated.
Now suppose that C ∈ X and S ⊢T C. Then there must be an n ∈ N such that Sn ⊢T C. Let
m ≥ n be minimal such that Bm is C. Then Sm ⊢T Bm, so we get Bm ∈ Sm+1 ⊆ S, that is
C ∈ S. Finally, supppse that C∨D ∈ S. Then there must be an n ∈ N such that C∨D ∈ Sn.
Let m ≥ n be minimal such that Bm is C ∨D. Then Bm ∈ Sn ⊆ Sm, so we certainly have
Sm ⊢T Bm. It follows that C ∈ Sm+1 ⊆ S or D ∈ Sm+1 ⊆ S. This concludes the proof.
Using the Extension Lemma, we can prove a sound- and completeness theorem for iGLC. This
result also appears, in a stronger form, as Theorem 4.25 in [AM17].
Theorem 2.4.8. Let A be an L-sentence. Then ⊢iGLC A if and only if A is valid on all
finite irreflexive realistic frames.
Proof. It is well-known that any finite irreflexive transitive frame is conversely well-founded.
So if ⊢iGLC A, then A is indeed valid on all finite irreflexive realistic frames, by Proposi-
tion 2.4.5. Conversely, suppose that 0iGLC A. Let X0 be the set of subsentences of A, and
let X1 = {B | B ∈ X0}. Then X := X0 ∪ X1 is an adequate set. We let W be the set
of all X-saturated sets. Clearly, W is finite, and we have the subset relation ⊆ on W . For
w, v ∈W , we write w ⊏ v if:
(i) whenever B ∈ L and B ∈ w, we have B ∈ v;
(ii) there exists a C ∈ L such that C 6∈ w and C ∈ v.
For w ∈ W and p a proposition letter, we say that wV p if and only if p ∈ w. We clearly
have: if wV p and w ⊆ v, then vV p. It is also not difficult to check that 〈W,⊆,⊏〉 satisfies
the model property. Finally, since 0iGLC A, there exists a w0 ∈ W such that w0 0 A, by
the Extension Lemma. In particular, W is nonempty, so M = 〈W,⊆,⊏, V 〉 is a model for
intuitionistic modal logic.
We claim that the frame 〈W,⊆,⊏〉 is irreflexive and realistic. Irreflexivity is immediate from
the definition. Now suppose we have w, v ∈W such that w ⊏ v, and B ∈ w. If B ∈ X0, then
B ∈ X1 ⊆ X and w ⊢iGLC B, so B ∈ w. Since w ⊏ v we get B ∈ v. Now suppose that
B ∈ X1. Then B is C for some C ∈ X0. Since w ⊏ v, we get C ∈ v. This means that
v ⊢iGLC B, so B ∈ v. In both cases, we get B ∈ v, so we conclude that w ⊆ v, as desired.
Now we show that w  B if and only if B ∈ w, for all w ∈ W and B ∈ X. We proceed by
induction on the complexity of B.
At For proposition letters, the result holds by the definition of V .
∧ Suppose that B is C ∧ D and that the result holds for C and D. If w ∈ W , then
w  C ∧D iff w  C and w  D, iff C ∈ w and D ∈ w. Now suppose that C ∈ w and
D ∈ w. Then w ⊢iGLC C ∧D and C ∧D ∈ X, so C ∧D ∈ w. Conversely, suppose that
C ∧D ∈ w. Then w ⊢iGLC C,D and C,D ∈ X, so we get C ∈ w and D ∈ w.
∨ Suppose that B is C ∨ D and that the result holds for C and D. If w ∈ W , then
w  C ∨D iff w  C or w  D, iff C ∈ w or D ∈ w. Suppose that C ∈ w or D ∈ w.
Then in both cases, we have w ⊢iGLC C ∨ D. Since C ∨ D ∈ X, we get C ∨ D ∈ w.
Conversely, if C ∨D ∈ w, then C ∈ w or D ∈ w since w is X-saturated.
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→ Suppose that B is C → D and that the result holds for C and D. If w ∈ W , then
w  C → D iff for all v ⊇ w, we have that v  C implies v  D. And this holds iff for
all v ⊇ w, we have that C ∈ v implies D ∈ v. Now suppose that C → D ∈ w and that
we have v ⊇ w such that C ∈ v. Then also C → D ∈ v, so v ⊢iGLC D. Since D ∈ X,
we get D ∈ v. Conversely, suppose that C → D 6∈ w. Since C → D ∈ X, this means
that w 0iGLC C → D, and hence w ∪ {C} 0iGLC D. Since w ∪ {C} ⊆ X, we can use the
Extension Lemma to find a v ∈W such that w ∪ {C} ⊆ v and v 0iGLC D. Then w ⊆ v,
C ∈ v, and D 6∈ v, so it follows that w 1 C → D.
 Suppose that B is C and that the result holds for C. If w ∈ W , then w  C iff for
all v ⊐ w, we have v  C. And this holds iff for all v ⊐ w, we have C ∈ v. Now suppose
that C ∈ w and that we have v ⊐ w. Then by the definition of ⊏, we get C ∈ v. Con-
versely, suppose that C 6∈ w. Consider the set R = {D ∈ L | D ∈ w}∪{C} ⊆ X.
Suppose that R ⊢iGLC C. Then {D ∈ L | D ∈ w} ⊢iGLC C → C, so we also get
{D ∈ L | D ∈ w} ⊢iGLC (C → C). In particular, w ⊢iGLC (C → C), which
yields w ⊢iGLC C. However, we also have C ∈ X, so we get C ∈ w, contradiction.
So R 0iGLC C. By the Extension Lemma, there exists a v ∈ W such that R ⊆ v and
v 0iGLC C. We have {D ∈ L | D ∈ w} ⊆ v, C 6∈ w and C ∈ v, so w ⊏ v.
Furthermore, we have C 6∈ v, so w 1 C.
This completes the induction. Since w0 0iGLC A, we have A 6∈ w0. Since A ∈ X, we can apply
the above result to conclude that w0 1 A. So A is not valid on the finite irreflexive realistic
frame 〈W,⊆,⊏〉.
3 An Abstract Arithmetical Completeness Theorem
In this section, we prove a completeness theorem for certain kinds of provability logics. We
prove the theorem in a rather abstract form, not yet mentioning any specific provability
predicates. In Section 3.1, we introduce the general framework and define the required Solovay
function along with the intended realization of the propositional letters of L. Section 3.2 is of
a rather technical nature and forms the heart of the proof. Here we show that the realization
we defined commutes with the logical operators of L. In Section 3.3, we formulate the
completeness theorem and use the preceding material to prove it.
3.1 Definition of the Solovay Function
The general setting of this section is given by the following definition.
Definition 3.1.1. Let T be a theory and let P (x) and Q(x) be Σ1-formulae in one free
variable. If A is an L-sentence, we write A for P (pAq). We also write △A for Q(pAq). We
say that (P,Q) is a good pair for T if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) P and Q are provability predicates for T ;
(ii) if N |= A, then ⊢T A, for all L-sentences A;
(iii) ⊢T SLP△ (or equivalently, ⊢T CP△);
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(iv) ⊢T △S → S for all Σ1-sentences S. ♦
We immediately observe that, if these clauses apply and S is a Σ1-sentence, then we also have
⊢T △S → △S → S. We also notice that ⊢i IΣ1 A implies ⊢T A, which implies ⊢i IΣ1 A
and ⊢i IΣ1 △A for all L-sentences A.
Remark 3.1.2. We remark that the definition of a good pair does not occur anywhere in
the literature. This definition is extremely artificial and tailor made to obtain the result of
this section. ♦
In the remainder of this section, we suppose that a theory T and a good pair (P,Q) for T are
given. We also use  and △ as defined above.
Let M0 = 〈W0,0,⊏0, V0〉 be a finite irreflexive realistic model for IML such that W0 has a
least element w.r.t. 0. Let r > 0 be the cardinality of W0. We assume that W0 = {1, . . . , r}
and that the node r is the least element of W0 w.r.t. 0. Now we expand M0 to a new model
M = 〈W,,⊏, V 〉 for IML. Intuitively, we append a copy of 1+ωop (in the ⊏-order relation)
to the node r. Formally, we do this as follows. We take W = N ⊃ W0. The relation  is
defined by:
i  j iff 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r and i 0 j,
or i > r and 1 ≤ j ≤ i,
or i = 0,
for all i, j ∈ N. The relation ⊏ is defined by:
i ⊏ j iff 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r and i ⊏0 j,
or i > r and 1 ≤ j < i,
or i = 0 and j > 0,
for all i, j ∈ N. Finally, V is defined by:
iV p iff 1 ≤ i ≤ r and iV0p,
for all i ∈ N and proposition letters p.
We can prove thatM is again a realistic irreflexive model for IML; but of courseM is no longer
finite. However, M is conversely well-founded, soM still validates all theorems of iGLC. Since
0 and ⊏0 are finite relations, we can give ∆0-definitions of these relations inside iIΣ1. Now
we can formalize the definitions of  and ⊏ given above in order to obtain ∆0-definitions of
 and ⊏ inside iIΣ1. Then iIΣ1 verifies the relevant properties of M : that 〈N,〉 is a poset,
that ⊏ is irreflexive, that 〈W,,⊏〉 has the model property, and that this frame is realistic.
E.g. by verification of the model property we mean that ⊢i IΣ1 x  y ∧ y ⊏ z → x ⊏ z.
Since  is defined by a ∆0-formula, we have: if i  j, then ⊢i IΣ1 i  j, and if i  j, then
⊢i IΣ1 ¬(i  j). A similar result holds for ⊏. Moreover, by Proposition 2.1.4, we can safely
make case distinctions like x  y ∨ ¬(x  y) inside iIΣ1. Observe that these remarks also
apply in T instead of iIΣ1.
For an A ∈ L, we define the set JAK as {i ∈ N | i  A}. The model M is constructed in such
a way that the following result holds.
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Lemma 3.1.3. If A ∈ L, then JAK is finite or JAK = N.
Proof. We have to show the following: if i ∈ JAK for all i > 0, then 0 ∈ JAK. We proceed by
induction on the complexity of A. The atomic case clearly holds, and the steps for ∧ and ∨
are trivial. Now suppose that A is B → C and that the claim holds for B and C. Suppose
that i ∈ JB → CK for all i > 0, and that 0 6∈ JB → CK. Then we must have 0 ∈ JBK and
0 6∈ JCK. By the induction hypothesis, i 6∈ C for some i > 0. However, since 0  i, we also
have i ∈ JBK, so i 6∈ JB → CK, contradiction. Finally, suppose that A is B and that the
claim holds for B. Suppose that i ∈ JBK for all i > 0. We should show that 0 ∈ JBK. By
preservation of knowledge, it suffices to show that j ∈ JBK for all j ≥ r. But for such j, we
have j + 1 ∈ JBK by assumption, and j + 1 ⊏ j, so we indeed have j ∈ JBK.
We now proceed to define the Solovay function. Our models are equipped with two relations,
as opposed to just one in the classical case, and we need to find some way to incorporate
this into the Solovay function. We will use two separate provability predicates to take care
of the relations  and ⊏. This is where our good pair comes in. Since P (x) and Q(x) are
Σ1-formulae, we can write P (x) as ∃yPrf(y, x) and Q(x) as ∃yPrf△(y, x), where Prf and
Prf△ are ∆0-formulae.
Let 〈·, ·〉 : N2 → N be a primitive recursive pairing function that can be formulated inside iIΣ1
using a ∆0-formula. Let p0 : N→ N be the elementary function that gives the projection onto
the first coordinate. By replacing Prf(y, x) with ∃z ≤ y (y = 〈x, z〉 ∧ Prf(z, x)), we may
assume without loss of generality that
⊢i IΣ1 Prf(y, x)→ x = p0(y). (3.1)
We do the same for Prf△.
In the sequel, we write x ≺ y for x  y ∧ ¬(x = y) and x ⊑ y for x ⊏ y ∨ x = y. We define
the function h : N→ N by h(0) = 0 and
h(k + 1) =

m if h(k) ⊏ m and Prf(k, p∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ m)q);
n if h(k) ≺ n and Prf△(k, p∃y¬(h(y)  n)q);
h(k) if neither of these apply.
Here x and y are two (syntactically) distinct variables, so by our assumption (3.1) above,
the first two clauses can never apply simultaneously. Using (3.1) again, we also see that m
as in the first clause, if it exists, is unique, and similarly for the second clause. Using the
Diagonalization Lemma, we can give a Σ1-definition of h inside iIΣ1. Then we can prove
inside iIΣ1 that h is in fact a function. We also have ⊢i IΣ1 x ≤ y → h(x)  h(y), which can
be shown by induction on y inside iIΣ1.
Notice that it is in some sense ‘easier’ to move along ⊏ than it is to move along . We
have ⊢i IΣ1 ∃y¬(h(y)  m) → ∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ m). Since Q is a provability predicate for T ,
we also find that ⊢i IΣ1 △(∃y¬(h(y)  m)) → △(∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ m)). We also observe that
∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ m) is equivalent, over iIΣ1, to a Σ1-sentence. This means that we also have
⊢T △(∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ m))→ (∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ m)). We conclude that
⊢T △(∃y¬(h(y)  m))→ (∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ m)), (3.2)
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for any m ∈ N. We will need this in the sequel. We also need the following observation: if
i 6= 0 is a natural number, then
⊢i IΣ1 ¬(x  i)↔
∨
j∈U
x = j, (3.3)
where U = {j ∈ N | j  i} is finite. In other words, if iIΣ1 knows that x  i for some
standard i 6= 0, then iIΣ1 knows that x is some standard number as well. For ⊑, a similar
remark applies.
We close this section with a definition.
Definition 3.1.4. For a sentence A ∈ L, we define the L-sentence [A] as{∨
i∈JAK ∃x(h(x) = i) if JAK is finite;
⊤ if JAK = N.
♦
We observe that [A] is always (equivalent to) a Σ1-sentence.
3.2 Preservation of the Logical Structure
In this rather technical section, we show that [·] commutes with all the logical operators
figuring in L. The proofs in this section will become increasingly difficult. We adopt all the
notation introduced in the previous section.
Lemma 3.2.1. We have ⊢i IΣ1 [B ∨ C]↔ [B] ∨ [C] for B,C ∈ L.
Proof. This is immediate from the definition of [·].
Lemma 3.2.2. We have ⊢i IΣ1 [B ∧ C]↔ [B] ∧ [C] for B,C ∈ L.
Proof. If JBK = N, then JB∧CK = JCK, so we have ⊢i IΣ1 [B∧C]↔ [C]↔ [B]∧ [C]. Similarly,
the result follows if JCK = N. So suppose that JBK and JCK are both finite; then JB ∧ CK is
finite as well.
The ‘→’-statement is immediate in this case. For the other direction, we should show that
⊢i IΣ1 ∃x(h(x) = i) ∧ ∃y (h(y) = j)→ [B ∧ C] whenever i ∈ JBK and j ∈ JCK. First of all, we
notice that ⊢i IΣ1 ∃x(h(x) = i) ∧ ∃y (h(y) = j) → i  j ∨ j  i. Indeed, reason inside iIΣ1
and suppose we have x and y such that h(x) = i and h(y) = j. Since x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x and
x ≤ y → h(x)  h(y), we can conclude that i  j ∨ j  i, as desired.
Now, if i and j are incomparable w.r.t. , then ⊢i IΣ1 ¬(i  j ∨ j  i), so by the above we
have ⊢i IΣ1 ¬(∃x(h(x) = i) ∧ ∃y (h(y) = j)), in which case the result is clear. If i and j are
comparable w.r.t. , then assume without loss of generality that i  j. Then j ∈ JB ∧CK, so
⊢i IΣ1 ∃x(h(x) = i) ∧ ∃y (h(y) = j)→ ∃y (h(y) = j)→ [B ∧C],
as desired.
Lemma 3.2.3. We have ⊢T [B → C]↔ ([B]→ [C]) for B,C ∈ L.
26
Proof. If JB → CK = N, then JBK ⊆ JCK, so [B → C] and [B] → [C] are both equivalent to
⊤, even over iIΣ1. Now suppose that JB → CK is finite.
We first treat the ←-direction. Let j0, . . . , js−1 6= 0 be the -maximal elements j of N such
that j 6∈ JB → CK. Then for all t < s, we have jt ∈ JBK and jt 6∈ JCK. Using the fact that ≺ is
also a conversely well-founded relation, we can show that for all i ∈ N, we have i ∈ JB → CK
if and only if i 6 jt for all t < s.
Now we reason inside iIΣ1. Suppose that [B] → [C] and △[B → C]. Since [B → C] →
∃y¬(h(y)  jt), we have △(∃y¬(h(y)  jt)). Now let kt satisfy Prf△(kt, p∃y¬(h(y)  jt)q).
We distinguish three cases (which is constructively acceptable).
1. Suppose that h(kt) ≺ jt for some t < s. Then then by the definition of h, we get
h(kt + 1) = jt. But jt ∈ JBK, so [B] holds, so [C] holds, and therefore [B → C] also
holds.
2. Suppose that h(kt) = jt for some t < s. Then [B → C] again follows.
3. Suppose that ¬(h(kt)  jt) for all t < s. Let k = maxt<s kt. Then we also know that
¬(h(k)  jt) for all t < s. Indeed, suppose that h(k)  jt for some t. Since kt ≤ k, we
get h(kt)  h(k)  jt, so, since  is (provably) transitive, h(kt)  jt, which we already
excluded. So we indeed have ¬(h(k)  jt) for all t < s. But then by (3.3) applied to
j0, . . . , js−1, we see that
∨
j∈U h(k) = j, where U = {j ∈ N | j 6 jt for all t < s} is
a finite set. We see (outside iIΣ1) that U = JB → CK, so (inside iIΣ1 again) we get
[B → C].
We conclude that ⊢i IΣ1 ([B] → [C]) → (△[B → C] → [B → C]). Since ⊢T SLP△, we may
conclude that ⊢T ([B]→ [C])→ [B → C].
The →-direction is even provable in iIΣ1. Notice that JB ∧ (B → C)K ⊆ JCK, so by
Lemma 3.2.2, we have
⊢i IΣ1 ([B] ∧ [B → C])→ [B ∧ (B → C)]→ [C],
so ⊢i IΣ1 [B → C]→ ([B]→ [C]).
Before we can show that [·] commutes with , we first need some auxiliary results.
Lemma 3.2.4. Suppose i > 0 is a natural number. Then
⊢T ∃x(h(x) = i)→ (∃y (i ≺ h(y))).
Proof. Before we start proving the displayed sentence inside T , we need to verify two auxiliary
facts inside iIΣ1. First of all, we claim that
⊢i IΣ1 (¬(h(y)  i) ∧ h(x) = i)→ i ≺ h(y).
Reason inside iIΣ1 and assume the antecedent. If y < x, then h(y)  h(x) = i, quod non.
So x ≤ y, which means that i = h(x)  h(y). But h(y) cannot be equal to i, so i ≺ h(y), as
desired. Now we also have:
⊢i IΣ1 (∃y¬(h(y)  i) ∧ ∃x(h(x) = i))→ ∃y (i ≺ h(y)). (3.4)
Secondly, we claim that
⊢i IΣ1 (¬(h(y) ⊑ i) ∧ h(x) = i ∧ h(x− 1) ⊏ i)→ i ≺ h(y).
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Again, reason inside iIΣ1 and assume the antecedent. Suppose that y < x. Then y ≤ x− 1,
so h(y)  h(x− 1) ⊏ i. Since our frame (provably) has the model property, we get h(y) ⊏ i,
contradiction. So y ≥ x. But then i = h(x)  h(y) and ¬(i = h(y)), so i ≺ h(y), as desired.
We also find:
⊢i IΣ1 ∃y (¬(h(y) ⊑ i)) ∧ ∃x(h(x) = i ∧ h(x− 1) ⊏ i)→ ∃y (i ≺ h(y)). (3.5)
Now we start the main part of the proof. Reason inside T , and suppose that we have an x
such that h(x) = i. Since h is (provably) a function, we can consider the least x such that
h(x) = i. Then x > 0, and h(x − 1) ≺ i. Again, we make a constructively acceptable case
distinction.
1. Suppose that ¬(h(x − 1) ⊏ i). Then △(∃y¬(h(y)  i)) (otherwise, we wouldn’t have
moved up to i). Since ∃x(h(x) = i) is a Σ1-sentence, we also get△(∃x(h(x) = i)). Using
(3.4) and the properties of △, we can conclude that △∃y (i ≺ h(y)). Since ∃y (i ≺ h(y))
is a Σ1-sentence, we also get (∃y (i ≺ h(y)) by (3.2), as desired.
2. Suppose that h(x − 1) ⊏ i. Then, from the fact that we moved up to i, we can
deduce that (∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ i)) or △(∃y¬(h(y)  i)). By (3.2), we can conclude that
(∃y¬(h(y) ⊑ i)) in both cases. At this point, we have ∃x(h(x) = i ∧ h(x − 1) ⊏ i).
Since this is a Σ1-sentence, we also get (∃xh(x) = i ∧ h(x− 1) ⊏ i)). Using (3.5) and
the properties of , we again find ∃y (i ≺ h(y)), as desired.
Lemma 3.2.5. Let i, j be natural numbers such that i ≺ j and ¬(i ⊏ j). Then
⊢i IΣ1 ∃x(h(x) = i) ∧ ∃y (h(y) = j)→△(∃z (j ≺ h(z))).
Proof. First of all, we notice that we also know that i ≺ j and ¬(i ⊏ j) inside iIΣ1. Now
reason inside iIΣ1, and suppose that ∃x(h(x) = i) and ∃y (h(y) = j). Since h is (provably)
a function, we can consider the least y such that h(y) = j. Then y > 0, and h(y − 1) ≺ j.
Consider an x such that h(x) = i. Suppose that y ≤ x. Then j = h(y) ≺ h(x) = i ≺ j, which
is a contradiction since  is (provably) antisymmetric. So x < y, which also means x ≤ y−1.
Now we get i = h(x)  h(y − 1).
If h(y − 1) ⊏ j, then i  h(y − 1) ⊏ j, so i ⊏ j. But we also have ¬(i ⊏ j), so we must
have ¬(h(y − 1) ⊏ j). Now we can use the exact same reasoning as in case 1 in the proof of
Lemma 3.2.4 (with j instead of i, and y instead of x) to arrive at △∃z (j ≺ h(z)), as desired.
(Observe that we can perform this reasoning inside iIΣ1 instead of T , since we do not need
(3.2) here.)
Now that we have proven these tedious lemmata, we can derive our crucial result.
Lemma 3.2.6. We have ⊢T [B]↔ [B] for all B ∈ L.
Proof. If JBK = N, then JBK = N as well, and we see that [B] and [B] are both equivalent
to ⊤ over iIΣ1. Now suppose that JBK is finite.
We first treat the ←-direction, which can be shown even in iIΣ1. Let j0, . . . , js−1 6= 0 be the
⊏-maximal elements j of N such that j 6∈ JBK. Notice that jt ∈ JBK for all t < s. Suppose
that we have i ∈ JBK and t < s such that i ⊑ jt. Since M is realistic, we get i  jt, so by
preservation of knowledge, jt ∈ JBK, contradiction. So if i ∈ JBK, then i 6⊑ jt. In particular,
we have ⊢i IΣ1 [B] → ∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ jt) for all t < s. Using the transitivity of ⊏ and the fact
that ⊏ is a conversely well-founded relation, we can also show: if i 6⊑ jt for all t < s, then
i ∈ JBK.
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Now we reason inside iIΣ1 and suppose that [B]. Then (∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ jt)) also holds. Let
kt satisfy Prf(kt, p∃x¬(h(x) ⊑ jt)q). We distinguish three cases.
1. Suppose h(kt) ⊏ jt for some t < s. Then by the definition of h, we have h(kt + 1) = jt,
and [B] follows.
2. Suppose h(kt) = jt for some t < s. Then [B] again follows.
3. Suppose that ¬(h(kt) ⊑ jt) for all t < s. Let k = maxt<s kt. If h(k) = jt for some t < s,
then [B] again follows. Suppose h(k) ⊏ jt for some t < s. Since h(kt)  h(k) ⊏ jt
and our frame (provably) has the model property, we get h(kt) ⊏ jt, which we already
excluded. So we have ¬(h(k) ⊑ jt) for all t < s. But then using the ⊑-analogue of (3.3)
for j0, . . . , js−1, we see that
∨
j∈U h(k) = j, where U = {j ∈ N | j 6⊑ jt for all t < s} is a
finite set. We see (outside iIΣ1) that U = JBK ⊆ JBK, where the inclusion holds since
M is realistic. So (inside iIΣ1 again), we get [B], as desired.
Now we treat the →-direction. Consider an i ∈ JBK. Then i > 0, since JBK is finite. So by
Lemma 3.2.4, we have
⊢T ∃x(h(x) = i)→ (∃y (i ≺ h(y))). (3.6)
Every nonzero node k of M has a finite ≺-rank, which is the greatest n such that there exists
a sequence k = k0 ≺ k1 ≺ · · · ≺ kn. Let a ∈ N be the ≺-rank of i. For b ∈ N, we define the
finite set
Ub = {j ∈ N | i ≺ j, i 6⊏ j and rank(j) < b}.
We know (inside iIΣ1) that i ≺ h(y) implies that h(y) is a standard number. Moreover, such
a standard number must have rank smaller than a, so it is either in JBK (if i ⊏ h(y)) or in Ua
(if i 6⊏ h(y)). That is, we have
⊢i IΣ1 i ≺ h(y)→
∨
j∈JBK
h(y) = j ∨
∨
j∈Ua
h(y) = j.
From this, it follows that
⊢i IΣ1 ∃y (i ≺ h(y))→ [B] ∨
∨
j∈Ua
∃y (h(y) = j).
So (3.6) together with the properties of  implies that
⊢T ∃x(h(x) = i)→ 
[B] ∨ ∨
j∈Ua
∃y (h(y) = j)
 . (3.7)
Suppose that j ∈ Ub for a certain b ≥ 1. By Lemma 3.2.5, we know that
⊢i IΣ1 ∃x(h(x) = i) ∧ ∃y (h(y) = j)→△(∃z (j ≺ h(z))). (3.8)
Furthermore, if j ≺ h(z), then we know (inside HA) that h(z) is some standard number.
Moreover, such a standard number must have lower ≺-rank than j, so it is either in JBK (if
i ⊏ h(z)) or in Ub−1 (if i 6⊏ h(z)). That is, we have
⊢i IΣ1 j ≺ h(z)→
∨
k∈JBK
h(z) = k ∨
∨
k∈Ub−1
h(z) = k.
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From this, it follows that
⊢i IΣ1 ∃z (j ≺ h(z))→ [B] ∨
∨
k∈Ub−1
∃z (h(z) = k).
So using (3.8) and the properties of △, we get
⊢i IΣ1 ∃x(h(x) = i) ∧ ∃y (h(y) = j)→△
[B] ∨ ∨
k∈Ub−1
∃z (h(z) = k)
 .
This holds for all j ∈ Ub, so
⊢i IΣ1 ∃x(h(x) = i) ∧
∨
j∈Ub
(∃y (h(y) = j))→△
[B] ∨ ∨
j∈Ub−1
∃y (h(y) = j)
 .
(We changed some bound variables on the right hand side.) Since [B] is equivalent, over iIΣ1,
to a Σ1-sentence, we also have
⊢i IΣ1 [B]→△[B]→△
[B] ∨ ∨
j∈Ub−1
∃y (h(y) = j)
 .
So we conclude that
⊢i IΣ1 ∃x(h(x) = i) ∧
[B] ∨ ∨
j∈Ub
(∃y (h(y) = j))
→△
[B] ∨ ∨
j∈Ub−1
∃y (h(y) = j)
 .
Since ∃x(h(x) = i) is equivalent, over iIΣ1, to a Σ1-sentence, we have ⊢i IΣ1 ∃x(h(x) = i) →
(∃x(h(x) = i)). Now we see:
⊢i IΣ1 ∃x(h(x) = i) ∧
[B] ∨ ∨
j∈Ub
∃y (h(y) = j)

→ 
∃x(h(x) = i) ∧
[B] ∨ ∨
j∈Ub
(∃y (h(y) = j))

→ △
[B] ∨ ∨
j∈Ub−1
∃y (h(y) = j)

→ 
[B] ∨ ∨
j∈Ub−1
∃y (h(y) = j)
 ,
where the final step holds since [B] ∨
∨
j∈Ub−1
∃y (h(y) = j) is equivalent, over iIΣ1, to a
Σ1-sentence. Now we can apply this repeatedly to (3.7) in order to obtain
⊢T ∃x(h(x) = i)→ 
[B] ∨ ∨
j∈U0
∃y (h(y) = j)

↔ ([B] ∨ ⊥)
↔ [B],
where we used that U0 = ∅.
Since this holds for all i ∈ JBK, we can conclude that ⊢T [B]→ [B], as desired.
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3.3 The Completeness Theorem
In this section, we formulate and prove our completeness theorem in its abstract form. First,
we define provability logics.
Definition 3.3.1. Let T be a theory and let P (x) be a Σ1-formula in one free variable. If A
is an L-sentence, we write A for P (pAq).
(i) A realization is a function σ that assigns, to each proposition letter p in L, an L-
sentence σ(p). We call σ a Σ1-realization if σ(p) ∈ Σ1 for all p.
(ii) Given a realization σ, we define the function σP from L to L-sentences by:
(a) σP (⊥) is ⊥ and σP (p) is σ(p) for every proposition letter p;
(b) σP (B ◦ C) is σP (B) ◦ σP (C) for all B,C ∈ L and ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→};
(c) σP (B) is (σP (B)) for all B ∈ L.
(iii) The logic for P w.r.t. T is defined as the set of all A ∈ L such that ⊢T σP (A) for every
realization σ. The Σ1-logic for P w.r.t. T is the set of all A ∈ L such that ⊢T σP (A)
for every Σ1-realization σ.
By abuse of notation, we also write σ instead of σP , and we say ‘logic for ’ instead of ‘logic
for P ’. We write σT for σT = σBewT and σ
f
T for σf
T
= σ
Bew
f
T
. The (Σ1-)logic for T w.r.t.
T is called the (Σ1-)provability logic of T , and the (Σ1-)logic for 
f
T w.r.t. T is called the fast
(Σ1-)provability logic of T . ♦
Now, we again adopt the conventions and notation from Section 3.1. All the work from
Section 3.2 now leads to the following result.
Theorem 3.3.2. Define the Σ1-realization σ by σ(p) = [p] for every proposition letter p.
Then ⊢T σ(A)↔ [A] for all A ∈ L.
Proof. This follows by induction on the complexity of A using Lemma 3.2.1, Lemma 3.2.2,
Lemma 3.2.3 and Lemma 3.2.6.
The following result tells us what the ‘real’ behaviour of the Solovay function h is, in the case
that T is Σ1-sound.
Proposition 3.3.3. Suppose that T is Σ1-sound. Then N |= h(x) = 0.
Proof. Since ≺ is conversely well-founded, we know that h must have a certain limit i ∈ N.
Then ∃x(h(x) = i) is a true Σ1-sentence, which means that ⊢T ∃x(h(x) = i). Now suppose
that i > 0. Then ⊢T ∃x(h(x) = i) → (∃y (i  h(y))) by Lemma 3.2.4, so we must have
⊢T (∃y (i  h(y))). Since (∃y (i  h(y))) is a Σ1-sentence and T is Σ1-sound, we see that
N |= (∃y (i  h(y))). By requirement (ii) for a good pair, we get ⊢T ∃y (i ≺ h(y)). Since
∃y (i ≺ h(y)) is a Σ1-sentence and T is Σ1-sound, we get N |= ∃y (i ≺ h(y)). However, this is
impossible as i is supposed to be the limit of h. So i = 0, and the result follows.
Now we can finally formulate and prove our main result.
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Theorem 3.3.4. Let T be a Σ1-sound theory. Suppose we have a good pair (P,Q) for T such
that ⊢T CPP . Then the (Σ1-)logic for P is equal to the set of theorems of iGLC.
Proof. As before, let us abbreviate P (pAq) as A, for L-sentences A. Since P (x) is a prov-
ability predicate for T , we see that the (Σ1-)logic for  contains the axioms of iGL and is
closed under →E and Nec. Since ⊢T CP, we see that the (Σ1-)logic for  also contains all
sentences of the form A→ A, where A ∈ L. So the (Σ1-)logic for  contains all theorems
of iGLC.
Now suppose that we have A ∈ L such that iGLC 0 A. Then by Theorem 2.4.8, there exists
a finite, irreflexive, realistic model M0 = 〈W0,0,⊏0, V0〉 in which A is not valid. We label
the nodes of M0 as W0 = {1, . . . , r} in such a way that M0, r 1 A. By shrinking W0 to
{i ∈W0 | r 0 i} if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that r is the 0-least
element of W0.
Now define the model M , the Solovay function h, and the Σ1-sentences [B] for B ∈ L as
above. It is easy to show that M0, i  B iff M, i  B for all B ∈ L and all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
So we have M, r 1 A, that is, r 6∈ JAK. Now define the Σ1-realization σ by σ(p) = [p] for
every proposition letter p. By Theorem 3.3.2, we have ⊢T σ(B)↔ [B] for all B ∈ L.
Now suppose for the sake of contradiction that ⊢T σ(A). Then we also get ⊢T [A]. Since [A]
is (equivalent to) a Σ1-sentence and T is Σ1-sound, we see that N |= [A]. By Proposition 3.3.3,
we also know that N |= h(x) = 0. This implies that 0 ∈ JAK. However, we also have 0  r
and r 6∈ JAK, which yields a contradiction. We conclude that A is not in the (Σ1-)logic for ,
as desired.
4 Applications of the Completeness Theorem
In the previous section, we proved a completeness theorem in a very abstract form. In this
section, we provide several applications of this theorem. In particular, we will determine the
fast provability logics of the theories U∗, for Σ1-sound theories U , and we will determine the
fast and ordinary Σ1-provability logics of HA. First of all, we lay some further groundwork in
Section 4.1. Then, in Section 4.2, we determine the fast provability logics mentioned above.
Finally, in Section 4.4, we determine the Σ1-provability logic of HA.
4.1 The Sets NNIL and TNNIL
In the sequel, Lp is the language of propositional logic, and for A ∈ Lp, we write ‘⊢IPC A’
to indicate that A is provable in intuitionistic propositional logic. We notice that, if σ is a
substitution, A ∈ Lp and P (x) is Σ1-formula, then σP (A) does not actually depend on P . So
we will just write σ(A) instead of σP (A). We will also drop the brackets in expressions of the
form σ(A) and σT (A).
Like the authors of [AM17], we introduce the set of NNIL-sentences.
Definition 4.1.1. The set NNIL ⊆ Lp (‘no nested implications on the left’) is defined recur-
sively, as follows:
(i) all proposition letters are in NNIL, as is ⊥;
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(ii) if A,B ∈ NNIL, then A ∧B,A ∨B ∈ NNIL;
(iii) if A ∈ Lp contains no implications and B ∈ NNIL, then A→ B ∈ NNIL. ♦
That is, a NNIL-sentence is a propositional sentence in which no implication occurs in the
antcedent of another implication. In the paper [Vis02], we find the following result, that we
will not prove here.
Theorem 4.1.2. There exists a computable function (·)∗ : Lp → NNIL, called the NNIL-
algorithm, such that for every A ∈ Lp, the following hold:
(i) ⊢IPC A
∗ → A;
(ii) if B ∈ NNIL and ⊢IPC B → A, then ⊢IPC B → A
∗;
(iii) if σ is a Σ1-realization, then ⊢HA HA(σA)↔ HA(σA
∗).
Remark 4.1.3. Consider the preorder (Lp,≤), where ≤ is defined by: A ≤ B if and only if
⊢IPC A→ B, for A,B ∈ Lp. Consider also the subpreorder (NNIL,≤). Then items (i) and (ii)
above say that the NNIL-algorithm is left adjoint to the inclusion NNIL→ Lp. ♦
We can get an analogue of (iii) for fast provability.
Corollary 4.1.4. Let A ∈ Lp and let σ be a Σ1-realization. Then
⊢HA 
f
HA
(σA)↔ f
HA
(σA∗).
Proof. Since Bewf
HA
is a provability predicate for HA, we can derive from Theorem 4.1.2(iii)
that
⊢HA 
f
HA
(σA)↔ f
HA
HA(σA)↔ 
f
HA
HA(σA
∗)↔ f
HA
(σA∗),
where we also used Lemma 2.3.4(vii).
The NNIL-algorithm behaves nicely with respect to the theories UT and Σ1-realizations.
Proposition 4.1.5. Suppose that U and T are theories such that ⊢HA BewU (x)→ UBewT (x).
Then for all Σ1-realizations σ and C ∈ NNIL, we have
⊢HA UT (σC)→ U(σC).
Proof. We notice that, since σ is a Σ1-realization and C ∈ NNIL, we have that σC is equivalent,
over iIΣ1, to a sentence in A. Using Corollary 2.2.9 and Lemma 2.2.14, we see that ⊢i IΣ1
(σC)T → σC. We get ⊢i IΣ1 U (σC)
T → U(σC). Finally, we notice that the conditions
of Corollary 2.2.10 hold for V ≡ HA, so we get ⊢HA UT (σC) → U (σC)
T → U (σC), as
desired.
Following [AM17], we now extend the notion of ‘no nested implication on the left’ to modal
sentences.
Definition 4.1.6. The set TNNIL ⊆ L (‘thoroughly no nested implications on the left’) is
defined by recursion, as follows:
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(i) all proposition letters are in TNNIL, as is ⊥;
(ii) if A,B ∈ TNNIL, then A ∧B,A ∨B,A ∈ TNNIL;
(iii) if A,B ∈ TNNIL and A contains no implications outside the scope of a , then also
A→ B ∈ TNNIL. ♦
We notice that every A ∈ L can, in a unique way, be written as C(~p,B1, . . . ,Bk), for
certain C(~p, q1, . . . , qk) ∈ Lp and distinct B1, . . . , Bk ∈ L. It is easy to show that, with this
notation, we have A ∈ TNNIL if and only if C ∈ NNIL and Bi ∈ TNNIL for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now
we define an operation on modal formulae as in [AM17].
Definition 4.1.7. The TNNIL-algorithm (·)+ : L → TNNIL is defined by recursion, as
follows. For A ∈ L, write A = C(~p,B1, . . . ,Bk), where C(~p, q1, . . . , qk) ∈ Lp and
B1, . . . , Bk ∈ L are distinct. Then
A+ := C∗(~p,B+1 , . . . ,B
+
k ). ♦
Notice that, since all the Bi have lower complexity than A, the operation (·)
+ is well-defined.
The following lemmata show how certain results about NNIL and (·)∗ can be transferred to
TNNIL and (·)+. We notice that Lemma 4.1.8(i) also occurs in [AM17] as Corollary 4.7.1.
Lemma 4.1.8. Let A ∈ Lp and let σ be a Σ1-realization. Then the following hold:
(i) ⊢HA HA(σHAA)↔ HA(σHAA
+);
(ii) ⊢HA 
f
HA
(σf
HA
A)↔ f
HA
(σf
HA
A+).
Proof. (i) We proceed by strong induction on the boxdepth of A. As above, we write A as
C(~p,B1, . . . ,Bk), where C(~p, q1, . . . , qk) ∈ Lp and B1, . . . , Bk ∈ L are distinct. Then all
the Bi have smaller boxdepth than A, so we assume by induction hypothesis that
⊢HA HA(σHABi)↔ HA(σHAB
+
i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. (4.1)
If ~p = p1, . . . , pl, then we write σ~p as a shorthand for σ(p1), . . . , σ(pl). Now we take a Σ1-
realization τ such that τ~p = σ~p and τ(qi) = HA(σHABi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now we observe
that
σHAA = C(σ~p,HA(σHAB1), . . . ,HA(σHABk)) = τC,
σHAA
+ = C∗(σ~p,HA(σHAB
+
1 ), . . . ,HA(σHAB
+
k )) and
τC∗ = C∗(σ~p,HA(σHAB1), . . . ,HA(σHABk)).
So (4.1) gives ⊢HA σHAA
+ ↔ τC∗. Since BewHA is a provability predicate for HA, we conclude
that
⊢HA HA(σHAA)↔ HA(τC)↔ HA(τC
∗)↔ HA(σHAA
+),
where we used Theorem 4.1.2(iii). This completes the induction.
(ii) The proof is completely analogous, but with an appeal to Corollary 4.1.4 instead of
Theorem 4.1.2(iii).
Lemma 4.1.9. Let U and T be theories such that HA ⊆ U ⊆ T .
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(i) Suppose that we have
⊢HA U (σC)↔ UT (σC) (4.2)
for all C ∈ NNIL and Σ1-realizations σ. Then
⊢HA U (σUA)↔ UT (σUTA)
for all A ∈ TNNIL and Σ1-realizations σ.
(ii) Suppose that we have
⊢HA 
f
U (σC)↔ 
f
UT
(σC) (4.3)
for all C ∈ NNIL and Σ1-realizations σ. Then
⊢HA 
f
U (σ
f
UA)↔ 
f
UT
(σf
UT
A)
for all A ∈ TNNIL and Σ1-realizations σ.
Proof. First of all, we observe that the conditions of Corollary 2.2.12(i) are satisfied, so we
have HA ⊆ UT as well.
(i) We proceed by strong induction on the boxdepth of A. Write A = C(~p,B1, . . . ,Bk),
where C(~p, q1, . . . , qk) ∈ NNIL and B1, . . . , Bk ∈ TNNIL are distinct. Then all the Bi have
smaller boxdepth than A, so we assume by induction hypothesis that
⊢HA U (σUBi)↔ UT (σUTBi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. (4.4)
Now we take a Σ1-realization τ such that τ~p = σ~p and τ(qi) = U (σUBi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now
we observe that
σUA = C(σ~p,U (σUB1), . . . ,U (σUBk)) = τC and
σUTA = C(σ~p,UT (σUTB1), . . . ,UT (σUTBk)).
So (4.4) gives ⊢HA σUTA↔ τC. Since HA ⊆ U
T , we also get ⊢UT σUTA↔ τC. We also know
that BewUT is a provability predicate for U
T , so we also find ⊢HA UT (σUTA) ↔ UT (τC).
Using (4.2), we get
⊢HA U (σUA)↔ U (τC)↔ UT (τC)↔ UT (σUTA),
which completes the induction.
(ii) The proof is again completely analogous, but with an appeal to (4.3) instead of (4.2).
4.2 Some Fast (Σ1-)Provability Logics
Let U be a Σ1-sound theory. By Corollary 2.2.8, the theory U
∗ is also Σ1-sound. In order to
apply the completeness theorem from Section 3.3, we need to prove the following result.
Lemma 4.2.1. The pair
(
Bew
f
U∗(x),BewU∗(x)
)
is good for U∗.
35
Proof. By Lemma 2.3.4(v), we know that BewfU∗ is a provability predicate for U
∗, and we
also know that BewU∗ is a provability predicate for U
∗.
Since U∗ is Σ1-sound, we see by Lemma 2.3.4(vi) that N |= 
f
U∗A implies that N |= U∗A,
which implies ⊢U∗ A, for all L-sentences A.
By Lemma 2.2.17, we have ⊢U∗ CPU∗ .
The final requirement for a good pair follows from Lemma 2.3.4(vii).
Theorem 4.2.2. Let U be a Σ1-sound theory. Then the fast (Σ1-)provability logic of U
∗ is
equal to the set of theorems of iGLC.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2.17, we have ⊢U∗ A → U∗A → 
f
U∗A for all L-sentences A. Now the
statement follows from Theorem 3.3.4 and Lemma 4.2.1.
Remark 4.2.3. Since PA is a classical theory, we have ⊢PA B ∨ (B → A) for all L-formulae
A and B. This means that we also have
⊢PA PAA
PA → (BPA ∨ ((BPA → APA) ∧PA(B
PA → APA)))
for all L-formulae A and B. This, in turn, implies that
⊢PA∗ PA∗A→ (B ∨ (B → A)),
for all L-formulae A and B. So the (Σ1-)provability logic of PA
∗ contains at least the theorems
of iGLC extended with the axiom scheme A → (B ∨ (B → A)). This scheme is called the
propositional trace principle, or PTP for short. The theory iGLC+PTP for IML is sound and
complete with respect to finite frames 〈W,,⊏〉, such that w ⊏ v iff w ≺ v for all w, v ∈W .
The first author showed in [Vis82] that the (Σ1-)provability logic of PA
∗ contains exactly the
theorems of iGLC+PTP. Since iGLC+PTP is a proper extension of iGLC, we have an example
of a theory for which the fast and ordinary provability logics do not coincide.
Presently, the provability logic for ordinary provability of HA∗ is unknown. As pointed out
by Mojtaba Mojtahedi to us in correspondence, it strictly extends iGLC. A simple example is
the principle:
(⊥ → (¬A→ (B ∨ C)))→ (⊥ → ((¬A→ B) ∨ (¬A→ C))).
Mohammad Ardeshir and Mojtaba Mojtahedi have a manuscript, soon to be published, that
gives a characterization of the Σ1-provability logic of HA
∗. ♦
We now turn our attention to determining the fast Σ1-provability logic of HA.
Theorem 4.2.4. Let A ∈ L. Then A is in the fast Σ1-provability logic of HA if and only if
iGLC ⊢ A+.
Remark 4.2.5. This result gives an ‘indirect’ characterization of the fast Σ1-provability logic
of HA, since we first have to apply the TNNIL-algorithm, and then see whether the result is
provable in iGLC. But we can already see that the fast Σ1-provability logic of HA is decidable,
since iGLC is decidable (this follows from the proof of Theorem 2.4.8). In the paper [AM17],
the authors give a direct characterization of the set {A ∈ L | ⊢iGLC A
+}, by providing an
axiomatization for it. ♦
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Proof of Theorem 4.2.4. First of all, we show that the conditions of Lemma 4.1.9(ii) are
satisfied with U ≡ T ≡ HA. Let C ∈ NNIL and let σ be a Σ1-realization. We observe that
the conditions of Corollary 2.2.12(ii) are satisfied with U ≡ V ≡ T ≡ HA, so we have that
⊢HA HAA→ HA∗A for all L-formulae A. We also see that the conditions of Proposition 4.1.5
are satisfied with U ≡ T ≡ HA. Combining these two, we see that
⊢HA HA(σC)↔ HA∗(σC).
Since HA∗(σC) is a Σ1-sentence, we also have ⊢HA HA∗(σC) ↔ (HA∗(σC))
HA. Since
Bew
f
HA
is a provability predicate for HA, we get ⊢HA 
f
HA
HA(σC) ↔ 
f
HA
(HA∗(σC))
HA.
Using Lemma 2.3.4(vii) and 2.3.6, we get
⊢HA 
f
HA
(σC)↔ f
HA
HA(σC)
↔ f
HA
(HA∗(σC))
HA
↔ f
HA
∗HA∗(σC)
↔ f
HA
∗(σC),
as desired.
Using Lemma 4.1.8(ii) and Lemma 4.1.9(ii), we now see that
⊢HA 
f
HA
(σf
HA
A)↔ f
HA
(σf
HA
A+)↔ f
HA
∗(σ
f
HA
∗A+)
for all A ∈ L and Σ1-realizations σ. Since HA is sound, we see that N |= 
f
HA
(σf
HA
A) if and
only if N |= f
HA
∗(σ
f
HA
∗A+). We also know that HA∗ is Σ1-sound, so using Lemma 2.3.4(vi),
we can now see that
⊢HA σ
f
HA
A iff N |= f
HA
(σf
HA
A) iff N |= f
HA
∗(σ
f
HA
∗A+) iff ⊢HA∗ σ
f
HA
∗A+.
This means that A is in the fast Σ1-provability logic of HA if and only if A
+ is in the fast
Σ1-provability logic of HA
∗. By Theorem 4.2.2, the latter holds if and only if ⊢iGLC A
+.
4.3 A Theory with iGLC as Provability Logic
In this section, we present an arithmetical theory that has iGLC as its provability logic for
ordinary provability.
Recall the theory slow Heyting Arithmetic sHA, that satisfies sHA = HA and sHA ≤ HA,
but not HA ≤ sHA. We consider the theory ĤA := HAsHA. By Corollary 2.2.12(i), we have
HA ⊆ ĤA and by Corollary 2.2.8, the theory ĤA is Σ1-sound. Moreover, by Proposition 2.3.8,
we know that ⊢HA ĤAA↔ HAA
sHA for all L-formulae A.
We show that the (Σ1-)provability logic of this theory is equal to the set of theorems of iGLC.
In order to do this, we need to find a good pair for ĤA. In the previous section, the role
of P (x) was fulfilled by fast provability. In this section, we put ordinary provability for ĤA
here. For Q(x), we take BewsHA∗ . We know from Corollary 2.2.10 with U ≡ T ≡ sHA and
V ≡ iIΣ1 that ⊢i IΣ1 sHA∗A↔ sHAA
sHA for all L-formulae A.
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Lemma 4.3.1. The pair
(
Bew
ĤA
(x),BewsHA∗(x)
)
is good for ĤA.
Proof. We already know that Bew
ĤA
is a provability predicate for ĤA. Moreover, since sHA =
HA, we also have sHAsHA = HAsHA, that is, sHA∗ = ĤA. Since BewsHA∗(x) is a provability
predicate for sHA∗, it must also be a provability predicate for ĤA.
Next, let A be an L-sentence. We know from Proposition 2.1.10(i) that N |= 
ĤA
A implies
⊢
ĤA
A.
Moreover, by 2.2.17 with U ≡ HA and T ≡ sHA, we have ⊢
ĤA
CPsHA∗ .
Finally, let S be a Σ1-sentence. By Corollary 2.2.8, we have ⊢i IΣ1 S ↔ S
sHA. We also have
that ⊢i IΣ1 sHA∗S ↔ (sHA∗S)
sHA. Now we use Proposition 2.3.9(i) to find that:
⊢HA ĤAsHA∗S ↔ HA(sHA∗S)
sHA
↔ HAsHA∗S
↔ HAsHAS
sHA
↔ HAsHAS
→ HAS
↔ HAS
sHA
↔ 
ĤA
S.
Since HA ⊆ ĤA, the final requirement for a good pair follows.
Now that we have our good pair, we can prove the following.
Theorem 4.3.2. The (Σ1-)provability logic of ĤA is exactly the set of theorems of iGLC.
Proof. Since sHA ≤ HA, and ⊢
ĤA
CPsHA∗ , we see that
⊢
ĤA
A→ sHA∗A→ sHAA
sHA → HAA
sHA → 
ĤA
A
for every L-sentence A. This means that ⊢
ĤA
CP
ĤA
, so both statements follow from Theo-
rem 3.3.4 and Lemma 4.3.1.
4.4 The Σ1-Provability Logic of HA
We use Theorem 4.3.2 to determine the (ordinary) Σ1-provability logic of HA. This is the
main result of the paper [AM17], but the authors arrive at it using different methods.
Theorem 4.4.1. Let A ∈ L. Then A is in the Σ1-provability logic of HA if and only if
iGLC ⊢ A+.
Proof. First, we show that the conditions of 4.1.9(i) are satisfied with U ≡ HA and T ≡ sHA.
Let C ∈ NNIL and let σ be a Σ1-realization. By Corollary 2.2.12(ii) with U ≡ V ≡ HA and
T ≡ sHA, we have that ⊢HA HAA → ĤAA for all L-formulae A. We also see that the
conditions of 4.1.5 are satisfied with U ≡ HA and T ≡ sHA, so we see that
⊢HA HA(σC)↔ ĤA(σC),
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as desired.
Now we can use Lemma 4.1.8(i) and Lemma 4.1.9(i) to see that
⊢HA HA(σHAA)↔ HA(σHAA
+)↔ 
ĤA
(σ
ĤA
A+)
for all A ∈ L and Σ1-realizations σ. Since HA is sound, we get
⊢HA σHAA iff N |= HAσHAA iff N |= ĤA(σĤAA
+) iff ⊢
ĤA
σ
ĤA
A+.
This means that A is in the Σ1-provability logic of HA if and only if A
+ is in the Σ1-provability
logic of ĤA. By Theorem 4.3.2, the latter holds if and only if ⊢iGLC A
+.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, our goal was to give a Solovay-style embedding of frames equipped with both an
intuitionistic relation  and a modal relation ⊏. In order to approach this task, we considered
theories that prove their own completeness principle. This project has led to the following
results and insights.
(i) We were able to give a Solovay-style embedding of finite, irreflexive, realistic frames for
IML, in the presence of the completeness principle and the principle △S → S for
S ∈ Σ1.
(ii) We reproved the result from [AM17] that the Σ1-provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic
is equal to the set {A ∈ L | ⊢iGLC A
+}.
(iii) We showed that the fast Σ1-provability logic of HA is also equal to this set.
(iv) We showed that for any Σ1-sound theory U , the fast (Σ1-)provability logic of U
∗ is equal
to the set of theorems of iGLC.
(v) We found an intuitionistic theory of arithmetic other than PA∗, namely the theory ĤA,
for which we were able to determine the provability logic, to wit iGLC.
(vi) We discovered that for the theory PA∗, the fast provability logic and the ordinary
provability logic do not coincide.
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